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Abstract: The purpose of this article is to support the logical incompatibil-
ity of the opposing views as a criterion for characterizing disagreements as
genuinely metaphysical. That is, I intend to argue that a specific dispute is
a metaphysical disagreement only when the conflicting views are governed
by different logics. If correct, this criterion would not only help to sepa-
rate merely verbal from genuine metaphysical debates, but it also would
ground an argument against deflationism, guaranteeing the substantiality
and relevance of metaphysics. I intend to clarify the criterion, to present its
basic foundations and commitments, to give some logical and metaphysical
motivations for its adoption and some examples of its application.
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1 Introduction
We often classify as metaphysical, questions whose answers in-volve a characterization of the most general structure of the
reality. For example, do material objects exist entirely at every in-
stant of time, or they exist only partially at every moment, having
temporal parts? Do numbers exist independently of our thinking,
or our mental activity constitutes them? These questions are often
considered metaphysical because their answers depend upon a clar-
ification on how reality is structured and what composes it. Answers
to the first require a conception about what time is and how its pas-
sage affects and participates in the structure of reality, and responses
to the second require a conception about whether or not the struc-
ture of reality has a place for things we understand with thought,
but that have no materiality, such as numbers.
Because they are so general, metaphysical questions like these
often leave us with the feeling that any answer we give them will
have no effect outside the limits of the discussion itself. After all,
two plus two will remain four, regardless whether the numbers are
mental constructs or abstract objects that exist outside our minds.
The computer on which I write these words now does not change, it
does not get faster or slower, better or worse, when I consider that it
is here in front of me in all its existence, or when I consider that what
I have in front of me is only a small temporal part of the computer,
whose complete existence includes its past and future parts.
These forethoughts lead us to ask: would there be any substan-
tiality in metaphysical debates, or they are all a mere waste of time
without any connection to the world outside of the philosophy de-
partments? Do our conceptions of the most general structure of re-
ality have any consequence that goes beyond their own theoretical
limits? If you and I disagree about the role of the mind in the consti-
tution of mathematical reality, will our disagreement have any influ-
ence on mathematics itself or on its applications or on other fields of
our lives?
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Most ordinary people, scientists and even some philosophers con-
sider that the alternative of irrelevance and waste of time is the cor-
rect one. Moreover, even those who cherish metaphysics often won-
der whether an alleged specific dispute is relevant and substantial or
only a merely verbal disagreement. Does a hole, for example, have
ontological independence? Is it something that exists by itself, or its
existence is dependent on something else, and it is only an aspect
of the form of the material that houses it? Although I am one who
considers substantial and relevant the metaphysical questions, I am
not obliged to think that all supposedly metaphysical disputes are in
fact metaphysical. Perhaps this issue of holes is not a genuine meta-
physical subject. Maybe it is a merely verbal disagreement and not a
problem that deserves the label of a metaphysical problem.
Even if I consider that metaphysics is substantial and also regard
a specific inquiry as not merely verbal, but relevant, how to know
whether this query belongs to the field of metaphysics? The def-
inition I gave at the outset, that metaphysical questions are those
whose answers involve a characterization of the most general struc-
ture of reality, is too broad and vague to function as a criterion. Is
there a more precise way of distinguishing metaphysical issues and
disputes?
Let us reorganize the interrogations raised so far. The first and
foremost of them is:
(1) Does metaphysics as a discipline have any substantiality or its
issues are irrelevant to all matters beyond its theoretical limits?
A very effective way of answering the question about the relevance
and substantiality of any discipline is to analyze whether their the-
oretical disagreements have external consequences beyond its own
limits. If a theoretical divergence provokes other divergences exter-
nal to the narrow disciplinary scope in which it occurred, then this
divergence is not irrelevant. It is not a harmless verbal disagree-
ment, but a substantive divergence that spreads to other subjects.
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Moreover, if a theoretical disagreement affects other subjects, then
the discipline, the area of studies in which this dispute occurs will
not itself be irrelevant.
Suppose, for instance, that you and I have different philosoph-
ical conceptions of the notion of a human individual. Suppose we
disagree about what characterizes a human individual. Suppose,
furthermore, that according to my understanding of the subject, a
few-week-old embryo is not yet classified as a human individual.
The embryo does not meet all the criteria required by my concep-
tion of what a human individual is. Also, suppose that according
to your understanding, the same embryo meets your criteria and is
therefore characterized by you as a human individual. So our philo-
sophical disagreement on how to characterize a human individual
disposes us to disagree as to whether or not a few-week-old embryo
is a human individual. Likewise, a disagreement we might have
about how material things exist over time could drive us to disagree
as to whether the computer on which I type these words is entirely
in front of me now, or whether I have only a small temporal part of
it under my fingers.
One consequence of our disagreement over what characterizes a
human individual is that if according to my classification a few-week-
old embryo is not so characterized, then I can support the morality
and legality of abortion without contradicting the general principle
that every human individual has the right to life. On the other hand,
as you consider the embryo as a human individual, you cannot en-
dorse the morality and legality of abortion without contradicting the
same principle. Our dissent about what characterizes a human indi-
vidual then causes other disagreements outside its theoretical con-
text, since because of it, we will also disagree on the morality and
legality of abortion. Because of it, we will discord on ethics, law,
public health policies, and even our attitudes toward specific situa-
tions involving abortion or its possibility will also conflict. This case
shows that the philosophical discipline that encloses our divergence
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on how to understand the concept of a human individual is quite
relevant and substantial.
Similarly, with regard to our metaphysical controversy on the re-
lationship between existence and temporal duration, that has led
us to discord on whether what I have in front of me is the com-
puter in all its existence or only a temporal part of it; if we show
that this disagreement has consequences outside metaphysics, if this
conflict leads to other divergences in physics, engineering, or other
matters, if it spreads, then we will know that metaphysics is relevant
and substantial because we will have shown that metaphysical dis-
agreements have consequences that go beyond their own theoretical
limits.
Thus, we will have answered the above question (1) in a way that
guarantees substantiality and relevance to metaphysics if we answer
affirmatively to the following question:
(2) Do metaphysical disagreements have consequences that go be-
yond the theoretical limits of philosophy?
Metaphysics will not be an irrelevant loss of time if we show that our
disagreements over metaphysical questions spread and have conse-
quences in other areas outside their own theoretical scope. However,
in order for an affirmative answer to question (2) to work also as an
answer to question (1) that guarantees substantiality and relevance
to metaphysics, we first need a criterion for deciding when a par-
ticular disagreement should be considered as having a metaphysical
nature. Before answering question (2), we must then answer the
following question:
(3) What characterizes a specific proposal as belonging to metaphys-
ics and a particular disagreement as a metaphysical disagree-
ment?
My goal is to use the criterion that entitles this article, no metaphysi-
cal disagreement without logical incompatibility, as a characterization
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of metaphysical proposals and controversies that answers question
(3) in a way that leads to an affirmative answer of question (2) and,
therefore, to a response of question (1) that assures relevance and
substantiality to metaphysics. The foundation of this criterion is the
idea that the logical principles of inference constitute (or are coun-
terparts of) metaphysical principles, and that any particular meta-
physical proposal is inseparable from a specific logical proposal so
that there can be no genuine metaphysical disagreement without
there being a logical divergence or incompatibility. Clarifying this
criterion and its foundation, and presenting some logical and meta-
physical justifications for its adoption, as well as some examples of
its application, are the objective of this article.
So far, we have seen only that an affirmative answer to question
(2) conveys to a solution to question (1) which ensures substantial-
ity and relevance to metaphysics. Before ending this introduction,
let us finish our argument against metaphysical deflationism, show-
ing how the adoption of the criterion of logical incompatibility in
response to question (3) gives an affirmative answer to question (2).
In other words, let us see how the logical incompatibility of meta-
physical disagreements guarantees that they will have consequences
outside their theoretical limits and will, therefore, be substantial and
relevant.
Suppose, then, that you and I have a metaphysical disagreement
and that the metaphysical doctrine you support is incompatible with
classical logic and leads you to adopt an intuitionistic logic that re-
jects the principle of the excluded middle. Conversely, my favourite
metaphysical doctrine drives me to adopt classical logic. Then our
metaphysical disagreement meets the criterion of logical incompat-
ibility and prompts us to make inferences according to different
and incompatible logics. Now consider the following two sentences,
where “drinking” means “drinking an alcoholic beverage”.
(4) If I am drinking and I am driving, then I am breaking the law.
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(5) If I am drinking, then I am breaking the law, or if I am driving,
then I am breaking the law.
Sentence (4) is true in the vast majority of countries. It is forbidden
to drink and drive. Whenever I’m drinking and driving, I’m breaking
the law. Yet, sentence (5) does not seem to be true, because (5) is a
disjunction of two conditionals, and none of them seems to be true.
The first conditional of (5), “If I’m drinking, then I’m breaking the
law” is not true because in the case I’m at home, having a glass of
wine in a hard day’s night, I’m surely not breaking the law. Also the
second conditional of (5), “If I’m driving, then I’m breaking the law”
is not true because when in the next morning I’m driving to work
and I’m not drinking nor have drunk in the last 8 hours or so, I’m
not breaking the law either.
However, it turns out that the argument that has sentence (4)
as the only premise and sentence (5) as the conclusion is valid in
classical logic. This means that the truth of (4) justifies the truth of
(5) for all who reason through classical logic. So I, who support a
metaphysical doctrine that leads me to reason according to classical
logic, am obliged to consider sentence (5) also as true, even though
it doesn’t seem so to us. I would be inconsistent if I did not accept
the truth of (5).
Yet, this same argument, with (4) as the premise and (5) as the
conclusion is not valid in intuitionistic logic. This means that the
truth of (4) is not a sufficient intuitionistic justification for the truth
of (5). That is, you, who support a metaphysical doctrine that drives
you to reason according to the intuitionistic logic, can very well ac-
cept the truth of (4) and reject the truth of (5).
Here, our genuine metaphysical disagreement, that requires us
to reason according to different and incompatible logics, is making
us disagree on the truth value of sentence (5). Both of us agree that
sentence (4) is true, but only because we reason through different
logics, we disagree on the truth value of sentence (5). You can ac-
cept the common sense assessment of (5) as a not true sentence.
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I, in contrast, cannot and must give some explanation for its truth,
however strange and technical it might be.1
In general, whenever we reason according to different and in-
compatible logics, we use different standards to justify the truth-
1 Of course, there is a classic explanation for the truth of (5), whenever (4) is true.
Though it is technical and defies the most common interpretation the expressions
“and”, “or”, and “if...then” have in natural language. Regarding my driving and
drinking attitudes, there are only four possibilities: (a) I’m drinking and driving;
(b) I’m drinking but not driving; (c) I’m driving but not drinking; (d) I’m
not drinking, neither driving. In situation (a), I’m breaking the law, because (4)
is a true sentence. Then, both conditionals of sentence (5) ‘If I’m drinking, then
I’m breaking the law’ and ‘If I’m driving, then I’m breaking the law’ will have the
antecedent and the consequent both true, which makes (5) also true. In situation
(b), the second conditional of sentence (5) ‘If I’m driving, then I’m breaking the
law’ is classically true, because it has a false antecedent. Then sentence (5), which
has this true conditional as one of its disjuncts, is also true. In situation (c), the
first conditional of sentence (5) ‘If I’m drinking, then I’m breaking the law’ will be
classically true, because it has a false antecedent. Then, again, sentence (5), which
has this true conditional as one of its disjuncts, will also be true. In situation (d),
both conditionals of sentence (5) are true by having false antecedents. Then (5) is
also true. So, according to classical logic, whenever (4) is true, (5) is also true.
Our natural tendency to regard sentence (5) as not true is because it is not at
all true when we read its two conditionals not as indicative or factual condition-
als, but as subjunctive conditionals, which may be counterfactual. When we read
(5), we tend to understand it as saying (5’) ‘Whenever I’m drinking, I’m breaking
the law, or whenever I’m driving, I’m breaking the law’. According to this subjunc-
tive understanding, sentence (5’) is clearly not true, for the exact reasons we gave
earlier in our common sense assessment of (5). Moreover, it is interesting to note
that the compatibility of (5’) (the subjunctive reading of (5)) with the intuition-
istic logic is neither incidental nor innocent. The famous Godel-McKinsey-Tarsky
translation between intuitionistic logic and the modal logic S4 shows the capacity
of intuitionistic logic to harbour counterfactual situations. In contrast, the notori-
ous oddity of the classical truth table for the conditional shows that classical logic
forces an unnatural construal of this operator that forbids any subjunctive reading,
which renders classical logic incapable of dealing with counterfactual situations. It
is also interesting to note the metaphysical aspect of this logical divergence. The
admission or rejection of the possibility that counterfactual circumstances can dis-
tinguish and characterize actual individuals is a metaphysical attitude with logical
consequences. The admission of this possibility is compatible with intuitionistic
logic and incompatible with classical logic.
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value of sentences. If P1, ...,Pn ⊢ A is a valid argument according
to the logic that I use, but invalid according to the logic that you use,
and if we both agree with the truth of all premises P1, ...,Pn, you
and I still may disagree on the truth of A. For me, A must be true,
for P1, ...,Pn justify its truth according to the logic that I reason, but
for you A may not be true, because P1, ...,Pn are not sufficient to
justify A’s truth according to the logic you reason. Our disagreement
about A’s truth-value, then, is rationally authorized by our logical
disagreement. A can be any sentence of any subject. So, our logi-
cal disagreement may breed disagreements on any subject, from the
most sophisticated to the most ordinary. Thus if what characterizes
a controversy as genuinely metaphysical is the logical incompatibil-
ity of the opposing views, then any metaphysical disagreement may
spread through logic and will have consequences in all matters upon
which we reason. Metaphysical disagreements will, therefore, be
substantial and relevant.
So if we eventually come across the literature with supposedly
metaphysical debates that have no consequence beyond their own
limits, this can only have occurred because the opposing positions
are not logically incompatible. However, in this case, according to
our criterion, this will not be a genuine metaphysical debate. Un-
doubtedly, the metaphysical literature is replete with examples of
this kind, and one of the main motivations of our proposal is pre-
cisely to separate these merely verbal discussions from genuinely
metaphysical debates.
The criterion I propose here is strongly inspired by the works of
two leading philosophers of the twentieth century. Willard van Or-
man Quine and Michael Anthony Eardley Dummett. This inspiration
is both positive and critical. On the one hand, I take advantage of
many of their ideas and, on the other hand, in recognizing the prob-
lems that more recent literature has pointed out in the approaches
of each of them, I construct the criterion as an answer or reaction to
these problems.
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In the remainder of this article, in Section 2, before properly clar-
ifying and justifying the criterion of logical incompatibility, I reflect
on its limits and on the dual role it plays as a thesis in philosophy
of logic and as a metametaphysical thesis. In Section 3, I briefly
present Quine’s methodological approach for ontology. His ideas of
regimentation and ontological commitment represent the first inspi-
ration of my proposal and constitute its first steps. In Section 4, I
clarify a limitation of the Quinean method and start the more de-
tailed explanation of the criterion as a means to overcome it. In
Section 5, I discuss Dummett’s way of dealing with the various in-
stances of the realism vs anti-realism debate, which will provide both
an example of a successful application of the criterion of logical in-
compatibility and some metaphysical motivations for its adoption.
Dummett’s approach to metaphysical debates represents our second
main source of inspiration. In Section 6, I criticize the traditional
thesis of the separation between logic and metaphysics and deepen
the arguments in favour of the interpretation of the quantificational
theorems of logic as metaphysical principles. In Section 7, I argue
for the thesis of absolute generality as a criterion of demarcation of
logic and reinforce, with logical arguments, the conception of log-
ical principles as metaphysical principles. In Section 8, I apply the
criterion to a specific controversy between Kris McDaniel and Peter
van Inwagen on whether there are only one or multiples modes of
being. We will see that in this case, the dispute is not a legitimate
metaphysical disagreement. Finally, in Section 9, I end the article
with a few brief final remarks.
2 Reach and Limits: philosophy of logic and metameta-
physics
From the first half of the twentieth century on, the idea of a sup-
posed metaphysical neutrality of logic gained strength and adher-
ents. It was already present in Edmund Husserl’s Logical Investiga-
tions (Husserl, 2015) and earned notoriety with the theses Ludwig
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Wittgenstein (2014) raised in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, stat-
ing that “the world is the totality of the facts, not things”, and that
the logical truths inform nothing about the facts, having no factual
content. Later, Rudolf Carnap (1969) gave definite form to this idea
and used it to isolate and protect logic from the heavy deflation-
ary criticisms that he and other logical positivists directed to meta-
physics. Finally, with the adoption of first-order classical logic and
Alfred Tarski’s conceptions of truth and logical consequence (Tarski,
1944) as the orthodox standard among logicians and philosophers,
the thesis of the metaphysical neutrality of logic has become hege-
monic and ubiquitous.
To illustrate this thesis, I usually tell my students the fable of a
local newspaper meteorologist who, on the first day of work, did not
want to risk her job with a wrong weather forecast and published in
her bulletin: “Tomorrow, in our city, it will rain, or it will not rain.”
Her prediction was right, but she lost her job anyway. The forecast
“it will rain, or it will not rain” is so general that it is a logical truth
impossible to be false. Rain or shine, it is correct. However, what is
the use of a weather forecast that, although true, does not help us
to decide whether or not to take an umbrella or a raincoat when we
leave the house in the morning? By gaining generality, the forecast
lost information, and the poor meteorologist, her job.
Because they are compatible with all possibilities in which facts
can occur, logical truths such as “it will rain, or it will not rain”
would be separate from them and from reality and would, therefore,
be merely analytical truths. They would not touch the facts and
would not help us know what will or will not happen. By informing
us nothing about reality, the logical truths would be metaphysically
neutral.
Despite the predominance of this thesis for much of the twenti-
eth century, the leading philosophers throughout history, from Aris-
totle to Russell, including the medieval ones, Leibniz, and Frege, did
not regard logic as metaphysically neutral. To the surprise of many
contemporary logicians, the principles of identity, contradiction, and
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the excluded middle, which are contemporaneously known as the
three Aristotelian principles of classical logic (D’Ottaviano & Feitosa,
2003), were not presented by Aristotle as logical principles or prin-
ciples of reason. They were presented as “the most certain princi-
ples of all things” (Metaphysics, 1005b10-35) (Aristotle & McKeon,
1941). That is, they were presented as metaphysical principles. An
indicator of this fact is that these principles were proposed and ex-
plained not in the logical texts of Aristotle, grouped by the ancient
commentators in the Organon, but in Book 4 of Metaphysics. There
they appear as the first principles of the science of being as being
(metaphysics) and hence of all other sciences (Smith, 2019).
We can also find traces of this metaphysical conception of logic
in Frege’s works. He thought that it would be possible to justify the
conception that the laws of logic are prescriptive laws of thought
only if we understand them more fundamentally as laws of truth or
laws that establish what is. To explain himself he distinguished two
meanings for the word “law”. In a sense, that of the laws of nature,
a law establishes what is. All factual occurrences always conform
to the laws of nature. However, in another sense, that of moral or
civil laws, a law is a prescription stating what it ought to be. Not
all factual occurrences conform to moral or civil laws. As thought is
a mental process, the laws about how thinking is are in the realm
of psychology, not of logic. So when we say that the laws of logic
are laws of thought, the only possibility is to understand them as
prescriptive laws of thought.
Yet, what gives logic the power to prescribe the laws of thought?
Frege’s answer was to identify the laws of logic with the laws of
truth, laws which in the most general possible context establish what
is.
Any law asserting what is, can be conceived as prescribing that
one ought to think in conformity with it, and is thus in that
sense a law of thought. This holds for laws of geometry and
physics no less than for laws of logic. (Frege & Furth, 1967,
12)
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Thus, what gives logic the right to prescribe the correct thinking is,
for Frege, the fact that logical laws are laws about what is. So, for
Frege, as for Aristotle, the laws of logic are the most general laws
about all things. They are metaphysical laws.
Nowadays, with the explosion of proposals of non-classical log-
ics, the thesis of the metaphysical neutrality of logic, although still
accepted and influential in many circles, has been regularly and in-
creasingly confronted.2 We may perhaps consider that the present
survival of the thesis of the metaphysical neutrality of logic is one of
the last and strongest influences of logical positivism in contempo-
rary philosophy.
The criterion I intend to present, motivate and exemplify and
which is the title of this article assumes the exact antithesis of the
metaphysical neutrality of logic. More than its metaphysical non-
neutrality, I want to support the opposite view that logical principles
of inference are also metaphysical principles and that any specific
metaphysical proposal is inseparable from a specific logical proposal.
So, it is not possible to have a metaphysical dispute without the
company of a logical disagreement.
Before clarifying and exemplifying its content, let us reflect a
little on how to understand the dual philosophical nature of the cri-
terion I propose. It includes both a thesis in philosophy of logic and
a metaphysical thesis, or metametaphysical, as some philosophers
prefer to call theses that deal with the nature and methodology of
metaphysics (Tahko, 2015). In the scope of the philosophy of logic,
the thesis that our criterion carries is rather simple. It follows the
tradition of Aristotle and Frege and represents the antithesis of the
metaphysical neutrality of logic. The logical principles of inference
are not metaphysically neutral. Instead, they are metaphysical prin-
ciples. By prescribing the rules of thought, logical principles estab-
lish obligations and prohibitions in force on all beings and can be
2 A prime example of this trend is Williamson (2015).
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interpreted as metaphysical principles describing the most general
structure of reality.
In its metametaphysical aspect, in turn, our criterion address two
fundamental issues. First, it answers affirmatively to the question of
the substantiality of metaphysics, as we have already seen in the in-
troduction, defending metaphysics against deflationist attacks and
also separating it from merely verbal and irrelevant disputes. Sec-
ond, it also proposes that the methods of logic can be fruitfully in-
cluded among the means of metaphysical inquiry. Here, however,
we have to be very careful. On the one hand, the criterion is bold
enough to assert that any proposal that deserves the label of “meta-
physical” must have a logical specificity, so that every specific meta-
physical position is related, as a counterpart, to a particular logic.
This no doubt gives logic a privileged methodological role in meta-
physical research. Yet, this privileged role should not be confused
with exclusivity. By no means I am proposing the end of metaphysics
and its substitution by logic, nor do I intend to legislate on the legit-
imate methods of metaphysical inquiry. Metaphysical proposals are
produced and argued by philosophers in various ways and through
diverse styles and traditions. These proposals and arguments can be
forceful and convincing enough to garner supporters, supplant rival
alternatives, and resolve issues without any need for explicit appeal
to logic. This healthy methodological freedom, however, does not
prevent anyone from applying our criterion to access, interpret, and
provide the logical counterpart of any metaphysical proposal, and in
doing so obtain sufficient insight and understanding to judge, eval-
uate, decide, complete, and even rectify the original proposal in its
own vocabulary. This same methodological freedom also does not
prevent anyone from searching for the specific metaphysical counter-
parts of the current myriad of specific logical systems produced with
the most varied motivations, which in most cases do not have the
most remote connection with metaphysics. In doing so, one could
extract metaphysical content from these logical developments.
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We can, by way of illustration, compare the relation between
logic and metaphysics raised by our criterion with the isomorphism
that Descartes showed to exist between algebra and geometry, when
he introduced the Cartesian coordinate system, laying the founda-
tions of analytic geometry. The emergence of analytic geometry did
not destroy either of the two disciplines in which mathematics was
divided. After Descartes, algebra continued to be algebra and con-
tinued to be developed independently of geometry, having the most
varied drives and applications. Similarly, geometry continued to be
geometry and continued to be produced separately from algebra.
However, analytic geometry made possible the use of algebra for the
solution of geometric problems and the use of geometry for the reso-
lution of algebraic problems. Analytic geometry assures us that every
geometric fact has an algebraic counterpart and vice versa. It even
allowed us to broaden the horizons of geometry beyond the three
dimensions of our spatial intuition, which had profound and fruitful
consequences in its applications in physics, for example.
The criterion I propose here is based on a hypothesis that can
be understood as the admission of an isomorphism between logic
and metaphysics similar as the isomorphism between algebra and
geometry that the Cartesian coordinate system gives us. Logic, then,
would be for metaphysics the same as algebra is for geometry. The
development of logic is guided by the agenda that logicians give to
their discipline in the same way that the development of algebra is
governed by the agenda that algebraists give to their subject. Among
the many motivations and applications that guide the work of alge-
braists today, there are also the geometric ones. Similarly, if the hy-
pothesis of isomorphism between logic and metaphysics is correct,
then we must find metaphysical applications in the developments
already made in logic, and we may include in the agenda of future
research in logic also metaphysical motivations and applications.3
3 Throughout the text I will use the expression “criterion of logical incompatibility”
to refer to the criterion of characterization of the genuinely metaphysical disagree-
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I am in no way proposing the end of metaphysics and its con-
version into logic. Nor am I proposing that all justifications and
motivations for research in logic be restricted to metaphysics. Yet, I
am proposing that we can look at the metaphysical theses searching
for their logical counterparts and that in finding them we will ob-
tain elements that may improve our understanding of these theses
and may help us to distinguish genuinely metaphysical controversies
from merely verbal divergences or other kinds of disputes.4
Given the immense breadth and generality of the metaphysical
inquiry and of the developments that are now considered to be part
of the logic, I am aware of the enormous difficulties that the cri-
terion I propose faces. I still have no answers for most of them.
Neither do I hope to garner the sympathy of the metaphysicians who
are averse to proposals founded on formal regimentation, nor from
those involved in debates that, according to our criterion, would
not be classified as genuinely metaphysical. To the former, I rein-
force that I do not propose the substitution of metaphysics for logic,
but only the use of a logical criterion for the identification of the
substantiality of metaphysical debates. This criterion, far from re-
placing metaphysics and its methods, from attacking it, reforming it,
or decreeing its end, is, on the contrary, a defence of its centrality
and importance. By linking themselves to specific logical positions,
metaphysical views guarantee their relevance and influence outside
their own limits, reaching all other subjects on which we reason. To
the second ones, those philosophers involved in debates that would
ments that entitles this article, and I will use the phrase “isomorphism hypothesis”
to refer to this isomorphic relation between logic and metaphysics that I propose as
the basis for the criterion of logical incompatibility.
4 Another consequence of the admission of the isomorphism hypothesis is that it
incites us to do the inverse research of the present one as well. That is, we can
look at the logical systems searching for their metaphysical counterparts and, if we
find them, we will obtain elements that may improve our understanding of these
systems, helping us to clarify, justify and classify them. The criterion opposite to
our title, no logical disagreement without metaphysical incompatibility, also deserves
our attention and research. But this is subject for another article.
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not be genuinely metaphysical according to the criterion of logical
incompatibility, I add that not being classified as metaphysical is not,
in general, a demerit. For most people, most of the time, it’s the ex-
act opposite of that, a virtue. The debate can be scientific, religious,
cultural and, in these cases, will almost always be relevant. Even if
the debate is merely verbal, it can still have relevance in clarifying
certain uses and abuses of words. Perhaps the very thesis that I ad-
vocate here is ultimately a merely verbal proposal on what should
or should not be included under the concept of metaphysics. Even if
this is the case, the criterion would not be irrelevant and meritless
for that alone.
I am also aware that the criterion I propose involves method-
ological and thematic choices on how to deal with each of the two
disciplines, which will undoubtedly displease many. Logicians and
metaphysicians may claim that both logic and metaphysics are very
diverse or broader than what I include under the hypothesis of iso-
morphism. My only solace on this point is negative. The issues of
disciplinary demarcation are extremely controversial, and as far as I
know, no proposal of demarcation of these two disciplines has raised
hegemonic adherence. The only I believe to be able to offer by now
is nothing more than an adequate definition of the criterion, some
clarification of its meaning, its philosophical commitments and pre-
suppositions, together with a set of both logical and metaphysical
motivations for its adoption, in addition to a few examples of its
application.
3 Quinean Metaontology: ontological commitment
To affirm that what characterizes a proposal as metaphysical is its
logical specificity, that there is no metaphysical disagreement with-
out logical incompatibility, evidences a strong commitment to for-
malization and links our approach to a tradition that has in Quine’s
methodological proposal for ontology its paradigmatic model. But
what is ontology, after all? For most philosophers ontology is a sub-
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area of metaphysics. Metaphysics deals with aspects of the most
general structure of reality. What things or kinds of things exist is
one of these aspects, and is the theme of ontology.5 As our criterion
is linked to the methodological proposal of Quine and uses many of
its elements, this section’s task will be to present the broad outlines
of his approach to ontology. 6
What we take as true commits us. Quine took advantage of this
platitude to propose a naturalistic methodology for ontology. He
introduced a criterion to identify what are the ontological commit-
ments of the theories we accept, and proposed that our ontology
must contain exclusively the entities that correspond to these on-
tological commitments drawn from our best scientific theories. Ac-
cording to him, in assuming a theory as true, we commit ourselves
to the existence of certain entities which are the ontological commit-
ments of the theory:
we are convicted of a particular ontological presupposition if,
and only if, the alleged presupposition has to be reckoned
among the entities over which our variables range in order
to render one of our affirmations true. (Quine, 1963c, 13)
For example, a theory commits itself ontologically with biological
species when the non-inclusion of them among the entities that are
values of the variables of the theory’s sentences makes some of these
sentences false.
Following the tradition pioneered by Frege and Russell, Quine
links existence with quantification. This binding causes these enti-
ties (the ones which have to be among the values of the variables
5 The distinction and delimitation between ontology and metaphysics is also a
controversial subject. I am provisionally assuming the hegemonic position among
philosophers. Ontology is a subarea of metaphysics that answers the question about
what things exist. In the following sections we will have more to say about the
distinction between metaphysics and ontology.
6 In Berto & Plebani (2015), van Inwagen (2009) and Durante (2014) there are
detailed and accessible expositions of the various elements that make up Quine’s
methodological proposal.
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of the sentences of our theories for them to be true) to be revealed
in the existential assertions. He explicitly states, “Existence is what
existential quantification expresses. There are things of type F if
and only if ∃x F(x)” (Quine, 1969, 97). So a theory commits onto-
logically to biological species only if the assertion of the existence of
biological species is one of the sentences of the theory. In general, a
theory T undertakes ontological commitment with entities of type P
if and only if the assertion that there are Ps is among the statements
of the theory. In symbols:
T commits ontologically with Ps ⇐⇒ T  ∃x P(x)
Another important fact to Quine’s proposal, often neglected, is that
the bearers of ontological commitments are not sentences taken in
isolation, but theories. And by theory, Quine understands its usual
logical definition. A theory is a set of sentences closed by the rela-
tion of logical consequence. That is, given any set of sentences T, the
theory T will contain in addition to the sentences of T all their logi-
cal consequences.7 So treating a given discourse as a theory, that is,
adding to the discourse all its logical consequences, provides us with
the ability to identify in the existential affirmations of this theory all
the ontological commitments of discourse.
However, this is a logical and formal criterion. Neither natu-
ral language nor even semi-formalized scientific languages explicitly
contain existential quantifiers and variables. So, before searching for
the ontological commitments of a theory, one must regiment it into
a formalized language.
The Quinean method for ontology, thus, requires three steps:
7 In symbols: T = {𝜙 / T  𝜙}. I use the notation T, written without serif, to
denote any set of sentences (a discourse), and the notation T, in boldface, to
denote the deductive closure of T. That is,T denotes the whole theory of which the
sentences of T are the axioms. In this way, the definition of ontological commitment
presented above could also be given by:
T commits ontologically with Ps ⇐⇒ ∃x P(x) ∈ T
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1. Regiment the best scientific theories into a formal language.
2. Use the criterion defined above to list all ontological com-
mitments (given by the existential affirmations) of these regi-
mented theories.
3. Include in your ontology only the entities corresponding to
these ontological commitments and nothing else.
Quine’s proposal for ontology is naturalistic. Philosophy works to-
gether with science. Ontology, by the way, comes after science. First,
give me our best scientific theories, then I’ll give you my ontology,
says the philosopher engaged in the Quinean methodological pro-
posal.
This philosopher does not have any freedom on steps 2 and 3.
They are fixed and correspond to mere applications of pre-estab-
lished procedures. The space for philosophical debate over ontology
then occurs exclusively in step 1 of the strategy, the stage of regimen-
tation in the canonical notation. Different paraphrases can lead to
different ontological commitments. However, as according to Quine
we must always respect Occam’s razor, then our ontology should al-
ways be the one that commits itself to fewer entities. We will include
in our ontology only those entities that are indispensable.
An ontological debate about whether a particular type of entity
P exists would always be a debate on P ’s indispensability. Let T
be the scientific theory that deals with Ps. And let T1,...,Tn be all
formal regimentations available for T . If all T1,...,Tn have among
their logical consequences the existential affirmation ∃x P(x), that is,
if for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Ti  ∃x P(x), then the entities P are indispensable
and must enter into our ontology. If there is some regimentation Tj,
1 ≤ j ≤ n where ∃x P(x) is not one of its logical consequences, that
is, there is some j such that Tj 2 ∃x P(x), then the entities of type P
are not indispensable and should not enter into our ontology.
The ontological debate restricts itself in Quinean methodology
to the contentions of philosophers as to whether or not different
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proposals of regimentation are successful in paraphrasing the whole
content of scientific theories. Given two successful regimentations
in this regard, the one that takes on fewer commitments and is more
ontologically economical wins the debate.
For example, if it is possible to present formal regimentations of
our best scientific theories related to biological species that do not
have among their logical consequences the affirmation of the ex-
istence of biological species (such as ∃xBioSpecie(x)), then this will
demonstrate that biological species are not indispensable and should
not be in our ontology. Regarding the numbers, however, Quine
included them in his ontology, for he saw them as indispensable.
Many of our best scientific theories commit themselves ontologically
to them by requiring that numbers be among the values of the vari-
ables quantified in their existential affirmations. Numbers should,
therefore, be part of reality and be among the things that there are.
However, for an ontological debate of this kind to be rationally
conducted, its participants must first agree on some important key
issues:
a) The philosophers participating in the debate have to agree on
which are our best scientific theories, those that deserve the
consideration of the philosophy.
b) They also have to agree on what is the formal language in
which the regimentations are done. What are the formal re-
sources that can be used in our regimented paraphrases?
c) Finally, they have to agree on which logic governs all theo-
ries. After all, different logics will point out different sentences
among the consequences of a given theory, which may lead to
distinct ontological commitments.
The prescriptions of the Quinean methodology for these agreements
are quite specific and restrictive. According to him, scientists, not
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philosophers, are responsible for the agreement (a). In Quinean nat-
uralized ontology there is no room for a priori philosophical specu-
lation about what exists. The work of philosophers begins only after
the scientific agreement on what our best theories are.
Concerning agreement (b), Quine stipulates that regimentation
must be done in the language of first-order logic, with identity, with-
out individual constants, treating names via Russell’s theory of defi-
nite descriptions. This formal language in which the regimentations
of all scientific theories must be made so that their ontological com-
mitments can be revealed became known as Quine’s canonical nota-
tion. Finally, concerning agreement (c), the only legitimate possibil-
ity for Quine is first-order classical logic, with the possible comple-
ment of his first-order set theory NF (Quine, 1963b; Durante, 2011).
This proposal of Quine for the methodology of the ontology has
many merits. His general notion of ontological commitment together
with the requirements of formal regimentation and indispensability
have helped to clarify some questions, such as the alleged contradic-
tion of non-existence statements (Quine, 1963c). However, his pre-
scriptions for agreements (a), (b) and (c) have never gained hege-
monic adhesion.
Regarding agreement (a), although there is a broad consensus
that the ontological commitments of scientific theories should be se-
riously considered in any ontological proposal, many philosophers
with a less naturalistic aptness are not willing to accept that science
has exclusivity in dictating the agenda of ontology. More serious
than this dispositional divergence are the limitations that Quine’s
prescriptions for agreements (b) and (c) impose on his approach. In
the next section, I will explore one of these specific limitations and
propose a way of transposing it that will conduct us directly to the
clarification of the criterion of logical incompatibility and the iso-
morphism hypothesis.
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4 Beyond Ontology: metaphysical commitment
Suppose we are interested in investigating whether the numbers ex-
ist independently of our thinking or whether they are constituted
exclusively by our mental activity. This question can be understood
in two distinct ways, either as a narrower ontological question about
whether or not numbers exist and form part of reality; or as a broader
metaphysical question about the role of the mind in the constitution
of mathematical reality.
For example, some people may say that if the numbers are con-
structs that only exist in our thinking, then they are not part of the
objective reality and do not exist. For these people, thoughts are en-
tirely separate from reality, and therefore, what is only in our think-
ing does not exist. For them, then, the disagreement over whether
the numbers are mental constructs or are independent of our think-
ing will not be a broad metaphysical question about the structure
of reality, but a restricted ontological question about whether or not
the numbers exist. If they are mental constructs, they do not exist.
If they are independent of our thinking, they exist.
Under this ontological reading, our question is treatable by
Quine’s methodology, which will help us answer it in one of two pos-
sible ways: or numbers exist because they are among the existential
assertions of the regimentations of our best scientific theories and
are therefore indispensable; or they do not exist because we have
succeeded in producing alternative regimentations of the scientific
theories that do not assume ontological commitments to numbers.
Quine admitted the indispensability of numbers and included them
in his ontology. Yet for him, as much as science, ontology and all
philosophy are also revocable. If one day we come to produce alter-
native and successful regimentations of our best scientific theories
that do not assume ontological commitments to numbers, on this
same day we must withdraw the numbers of our ontology. Some
philosophers, such as Field (2016), have adopted this agenda and
have been achieving remarkable partial results.
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Whatever the answer, this ontological interpretation of the ques-
tion is based on a more general assumption about the structure of
reality: what exists only in our mind, what is constituted only by our
thought, is not part of reality, does not exist. Then the ontological
interpretation of the question of whether or not the numbers exist
independently of our thought commits itself to the following meta-
physical thesis about the role of the mind in the general structure of
reality, which we could call realist thesis:
(1) The mind is separated from reality.
The other possible interpretation for the question of the relation of
numbers to thought does not treat it as a restricted ontological ques-
tion about the existence or not of numbers, but as a broad metaphys-
ical question about whether or not the mind has a role in the con-
stitution of mathematical reality. Some people may not accept the
realist thesis (1) and therefore consider that being constituted by our
mind is part of the admissible traces of the structure of reality. That
is, for these people one of the general characteristics of reality is that
the mind can have a constitutive role in at least some part of it, sus-
taining the existence of some of the things that we consider real. For
them, then, to assert that numbers are mental constructs does not
mean that they do not exist, it means instead that they exist, and
that the mind has a constitutive role in their existence.
Even if I disagree with this position and want to debate it, the
debate I will pursue will not be ontological. It will not be a debate
about whether or not the numbers exist, but a metaphysical con-
tention on the role of the mind in the structure of reality. The two
possible answers to this interpretation of the question are: either our
mind has no part in the constitution of mathematical reality, and the
numbers, if they exist, they do so independently of our thinking; or
our mental activity has a constitutive role in reality and the numbers,
if they exist, they are made up from our mental activity, having their
existence inseparable from our thinking. The first answer represents
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a commitment to the realist thesis (1) that the mind is separate from
reality, at least in the case of mathematical reality, and the second
answer represents a compromise with the opposing thesis, which we
might call idealist thesis:
(2) The mind is not separate from reality.
Take sides in this debate, however, does not necessarily compromise
us with any ontological thesis about whether the numbers exist or
not. Answering it by denying any role to the mind in the structure
of mathematical reality leaves unanswered the question of whether
or not numbers exist. Responding to it, on the contrary, assigning
a constitutive role to the mind in the structure of reality, brings us
closer to a commitment to the existence of numbers. But not to the
point of rendering incoherent a position that assumes the idealist
thesis (2) and at the same time denies that the type of mental activity
related to numbers is of the ontologically constitutive nature.8
Since this is not ontological, but a metaphysical debate about
the role of the mind in the structure of reality, Quine’s method of
ontological commitment will not help here. Assuming or avoiding
ontological commitments to numbers will not bind us to either side
of this debate. Is there something that binds us? Is there anything,
any pattern or indicator that would do in the case of metaphysical
debates like this one the same role that ontological commitments do
in the case of ontological debates? Is there anything we could call a
metaphysical commitment of a discourse or theory? We bet that there
8 The foundation of this position is the fact that some of our thoughts simply may
not meet the criteria we consider sufficient for them to constitute reality. Even if
the mind creates reality, it does not necessarily mean that all our casual thoughts
should create reality. It may be that only thoughts that meet certain criteria do
so. Concerning mathematical entities, this would be a bizarre position, since we
do not think casually about them, but in a very structured way that is governed
by mathematics. We might ask ourselves: if our mathematical thoughts do not
meet the standard for constitute reality, what other thoughts would meet? Strange
though it is, this is not a logically untenable position.
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is. Just as the existential assertions of theories express their ontolog-
ical commitments, the system of logic we take to regulate a given
theory or discourse would express its metaphysical commitments.
The idea is that if we accept the foundation of the notion of onto-
logical commitment, that is, if we accept that “existence is what ex-
istential quantification expresses” (Quine, 1969, 97), then we must
also accept that the logical principles that regulate the behaviour of
quantifiers and other connectives are metaphysical principles that
express a concept of existence and delimit the most general struc-
tural aspects of reality. This fact is the primary basis of our hypoth-
esis of isomorphism and of the criterion of logical incompatibility. If
the existential sentences of a theory express the entities with which
this theory commits itself ontologically, then the logic that regulates
the more general aspects of these existential sentences and all the
other assertions of the theory expresses the metaphysical commit-
ments of this theory.
Quine himself was not unaware of this fact. In “Existence and
Quantification”, reflecting on the differences between classical and
intuitionistic logic, he somewhat reluctantly admits:
Classical quantification theory enjoys an extraordinary combi-
nation of depth and simplicity, beauty and utility. [...] Devi-
ations from it are likely, in contrast, to look rather arbitrary.
But insofar as they exist it seems clearest and simplest to say
that deviant concepts of existence exist along with them. (Quine,
1969, 112-113)
In this same text, a few pages earlier, Quine had already stated that
the intuitionist has a different doctrine of being from mine, as
he has a different quantification theory; and that I am simply at
odds with the intuitionist on the one as on the other. (Quine,
1969, 108)
Quine explicitly admits here that the difference between classical
and intuitionistic theories of quantification, that is, between first-
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order classical and intuitionistic logics constitutes a difference be-
tween two distinct conceptions of existence, a classical and an intu-
itionistic one. Because classics and intuitionists disagree on what are
the valid logical principles, they also differ in how they conceive the
structure of reality and understand the very meaning of existence.
Despite this recognition, Quine was not willing to discuss meta-
physics in these terms. He was not interested in testing the meta-
physical hypotheses produced arbitrarily and a priori by philoso-
phers. His interest in the subject was limited to his naturalistic on-
tological method described in the previous section. The agenda of
ontology would be given by our best scientific theories that should be
regimented and evaluated according to first-order classical logic. So
the metaphysical doctrine of Quine, the only structure of reality that
he was willing to accept is the one given by the concept of existence
that supervenes on first-order classical logic, which he considered
adequate and sufficient to deal with all ontological questions posed
by scientific theories. Quine’s method is therefore limited to what
we have called the ontological interpretation of metaphysical ques-
tions, and his metaphysical doctrine is limited to the commitments
of first-order classical logic.
However, what exactly is the metaphysical doctrine linked to the
concept of existence given by first-order classical logic? As well as
it makes sense to say that in regulating the more general behaviour
of quantifiers, logical principles constitute metaphysical principles,
it makes the same sense to ask what is the metaphysical image that
these principles give us. After all, metaphysicians do not usually
present their proposals through logical principles of inference, but
through more pictorial propositions such as the realist (1) and ideal-
ist (2) theses, for example. Here the analogy with analytic geometry
proposed in Section 2 helps again. The logical principles and theo-
rems would be like the algebraic equations and the metaphysical po-
sition attached to them would be like the geometric figures described
by the algebraic equations. For example, the equation “x2 + y2 = 4”
is bound to a circumference of center (0,0) and radius 2. We can
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similarly ask what metaphysical position is linked to the theorems
and principles of first-order classical logic. More generally, we can
ask ourselves how to extract the different metaphysical theses given
by the concepts of existence of different logical systems.
Unfortunately, we do not have a general formula to answer the
questions of this kind altogether. The analogy with analytic geome-
try reaches its limit here. Algebraic equations are individually linked
to the geometric figures given by their Cartesian graphs. Yet we do
not intend to link one by one the principles of inference with their
supposed metaphysical images. I do not think there is such a one-
on-one link. In the same way that Quine argues that the bearers of
ontological commitments are not individual sentences, but theories
(sets of sentences closed by the relation of logical consequence), I
support that the holders of metaphysical commitments are not the
logical principles or theorems taken individually, but full logical sys-
tems. Different logics would represent distinct concepts of existence
and would be linked to distinct metaphysical proposals about the
structure of reality.
The methodological approach I suggest, then, for this task of
looking for the metaphysical positions linked to the various logical
systems consists of the logical analysis of metaphysical proposals and
debates. The criterion of logical incompatibility states that a specific
debate will be metaphysical only when different logics govern the
opposing positions. We must then search the literature for the sup-
posedly metaphysical debates, and we must make a logical analysis
of the opposing positions trying to identify which logical systems are
compatible with the inferences actually employed on each side of
each debate. When eventually we find a logical system that is com-
patible with the logical inferences used by the defenders of a specific
metaphysical proposal, then we can link this proposal to the compat-
ible logical system founded. In doing so, we will be linking a specific
metaphysical thesis, defended by one side of the debate, with one
particular logical system, the system compatible with the logical in-
ferences actually used by the defenders of this metaphysical thesis.
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When we apply this approach to numerous debates, we can, little by
little, form a network of metaphysical positions linked to the various
logical systems.
This methodological approach, however, needs to be applied with
caution. In the next section, we will discuss the reasons for this cau-
tion in more detail. We will use Michael Dummett’s proposal to deal
with the various instances of the debate between realism and anti-
realism both as an example of an application of this methodological
approach and as a case of successful use of the criterion of logical
incompatibility.
5 Different Reality Demands Different Logic
As we have suggested in the previous section, by limiting itself to the
ontological interpretation of metaphysical questions, Quine’s method
commits to the metaphysical position given by the realist thesis (1),
that the mind is apart from reality. Moreover, we have also seen that
by restricting itself to first-order classical logic, Quine’s method is
also committed to the metaphysical position linked to the concept
of existence expressed by first-order classical logic. Putting together
these two compromises, we could conclude that one of the meta-
physical commitments of first-order classical logic is the realist thesis
(1).
If this is indeed the case, then in any metaphysical debate, all
who restrict the logic that governs their position to first-order classi-
cal logic will, simultaneously, assume the realist thesis (1) that states
that the mind is separate from reality. More importantly, anyone who
disagrees with the realist thesis and wants to defy it will have to
give up first-order classical logic and will need to adopt an alterna-
tive logic. Michael Dummett, who for reasons wholly different from
Quine’s, also argued that different logics equate different metaphys-
ical positions (Durante, 2011), pointed out that the constructivist
mathematicians of the Brower school were the first to realize that
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to reject a realist metaphysical thesis, they would also have to reject
classical logic (Dummett, 1991, 9).
The criterion of logical incompatibility for metaphysical debates
is based both, on the linkage of existence with quantification, which
is the foundation of Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment and
on Michael Dummett’s proposals for a theory of meaning, which
would give The Logical Bases of Metaphysics, that is the title of his
seminal book. One of Dummett’s major metaphysical concerns was
to seek a unified methodology for dealing with the multiple instances
of the debate between the various possible forms of the realist and
idealist theses (1) and (2).9
Dummett deemed the ontological interpretation of these debates
to be misleading. For example, he argues that a debate between a
phenomenalist and a realist about the physical world is not a narrow
ontological debate about whether or not material objects exist, but
rather a broad metaphysical debate about what role sensory expe-
rience plays in the constitution of physical reality. Our knowledge
of the physical world is given by the senses, by our sensory experi-
ences. To the realists, these sensory experiences would have no part
in the structure of reality. They would be completely separate from
the reality they inform us and would be neutral vehicles of informa-
9 Dummett preferred to call anti-realism the perspective of the various theses I
am generically labelling here as idealists, of which the thesis (2) is only one in-
stance. He favoured this terminology because the term idealism is heavily loaded
with interpretations from the history of philosophy with which he wanted to avoid
unnecessary approximations. Some of the views he classified as anti-realists, such
as formalism in the philosophy of mathematics, are, in fact, quite distant from the
traditional understanding of idealism. As he considered the traditional approach to
metaphysical questions to be misleading and made a reformist methodological pro-
posal, he preferred to use a new jargon. I have chosen, by contrast, to maintain the
traditional vocabulary just to help to mark the fact that I do not intend the criterion
of logical incompatibility to be a reformist methodological proposal. If successful,
the maximum it can provide is an analytical tool to aid the understanding of meta-
physical debates, both the traditional and the contemporary ones. In the context of
the examples I use here, the labels anti-realism and idealism can be understood as
interchangeable without significant problems.
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tion about the physical world. The version of the realist thesis, in
this case, would be:
(1’) Reality is separate from sensory experiences.
For the phenomenalists, on the other hand, our sensory experiences
would not be neutral vehicles of information about the physical
world but would have a constitutive role in physical reality, taking
part in its structure. Phenomenalism is a version of idealism, and the
specific idealist thesis it supports would be:
(2’) Reality is not separate from sensory experiences.
Likewise, the opposition between Platonists and constructivists over
mathematical entities is not an ontological dispute about whether
numbers (and other mathematical objects) exist or not, but a meta-
physical disagreement on the role of the mind in the constitution of
mathematical reality.
Dummett thought the ontological interpretation to be mislead-
ing because he did not see how these debates, treated as ontological
questions, could be solved. He did not share Quine’s confidence in
the naturalistic method founded on the ontological commitments of
scientific theories, nor did he accept the traditional ontological and
a priori proposals of philosophers, which he called top-down. He ar-
gued, in contrast, for a bottom-up approach that would be obtained
by proposing a theory of meaning for the part of the language com-
prising the lexical terms of the metaphysical debate. This theory
of meaning would be made without any fundamental metaphysi-
cal presuppositions and would be based only on the inferential role
of the linguistic expressions, that would be achieved by an analy-
sis of their uses. By understanding, through an analysis of the use
of language, the inferential role of expressions related to a specific
metaphysical position, we would understand the meaning of these
expressions, given by the logic and the meaning theory that govern
the discourses of this part of language. From this understanding, a
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metaphysical image of the situation would emerge in a supervening
way. Metaphysics, for Dummett, would be limited to this superve-
nient image that emerges from logic and meaning theory.10
Debates should be dealt with on a case-by-case basis, and a re-
alist (or idealist) position concerning a specific instance would not
compromise anyone with the same realist (or idealist) position in
the other instances. Though arguing for the independence of the
various instances of debate, Dummett has identified, in his quest for
a methodological unification, that what links all realist approaches
on the one hand and all approaches against realism on the other is a
disagreement in the concept of truth.
Whatever conception of truth and reality we adopt, what we take
as true must be an expression of reality (Chateaubriand, 2001, 16).
If, furthermore, according to the realist thesis, reality is separated
from mind (or sensory experience), then truth is also so. That is,
truth cannot depend on our mind or our sensory experiences. So, for
a realist, an assertion will be true or false regardless of our mental
or sensory abilities to verify its truth or falsehood. Dummett has
shown that the main feature that unites all realistic approaches is
that according to them, truth is transcendent to verifiability.
For the realists, then, a given declarative statement P must be
true or false, regardless of whether there can be any evidence against
or in favour of P. Realism, according to this conception of Dummett,
can then be understood as a defence of the epistemological neutral-
ity of truth. To a realist, the truth or falsity of a statement is inde-
pendent of any restriction that may exist for the recognition of this
truth or falsehood.
On the other hand, for an idealist (or anti-realist in Dummett’s
jargon), the mind or sensory experiences are not separated from re-
ality, but on the contrary, they are part of its constitution and are in-
separable from it. So, being the truth an expression of reality, what is
10 A recommendable presentation of this methodological proposal is found in the
introduction of Dummett (1991), whose other chapters elaborate it in detail.
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true will also be inextricably bound up with our mind or our sensory
experiences, and therefore there can be no truth or falsehood where
they cannot be mentally or sensitively recognized. That is, for an
anti-realist, there is no truth or falsehood where there are no condi-
tions of verifiability. According to Dummett, then, the main feature
that unites all anti-realist approaches is that according to them, truth
depends on the verifiability.
A sentence P, then, can only be true, for an anti-realist, in virtue
of evidence favourable to P, and can only be false in virtue of evi-
dence contrary to P. So anti-realism represents, for Dummett, a de-
fence of the epistemological dependence of truth. For an anti-realist,
the truth and the recognition of the truth are not different notions.
They are, on the contrary, inseparable. There can be no truth or
falsehood where there can be no recognition of truth or falsehood.
Let us take a quick example. We do not know for sure whether
the statement “the universe is infinite” is true or false. There are
diverging theories on this issue, and there is no definitive evidence
to assure either its truth or its falsity. Moreover, we do not know
whether the kind of evidence needed to decide the truth or false-
hood of this statement may someday be obtained. That is, there is
no clarity about whether or not it’s possible to be any evidence to
decide the truth of such an assertion. To take these uncertainties
about the verifiability of the assertion that the universe is infinite as
sufficient reason to consider it as neither true nor false is, according
to Dummett, to adopt an anti-realist stance on the question of the
infinity of the universe. On the other hand, to admit that the state-
ment has to be true or false independently of the very possibility that
someday there will be evidence favourable or contrary to it is, also
according to Dummett, to adopt a realistic attitude on this question.
This semantic characterization is compatible with our more tra-
ditionally metaphysical or pictorial characterization of the debates,
represented by the realist and idealist theses. If we accept the re-
alist thesis and consider that the reality of the universe is separate
from our mind or sensitiveness, then either it is finite or it is infi-
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nite, regardless of whether or not there is a possibility that someday
we will obtain evidence for the recognition of the truth or falsity of
the affirmation of its infinity. On the other hand, if we accept the
idealist thesis and consider that the reality of the universe depends
on our mind or sensitiveness, and if we recognize together that the
present situation of our scientific, philosophical and empirical con-
siderations about the universe does not give us enough evidence to
decide on its finitude or infinity, nor does it guarantee whether there
can ever be such evidence, then we must also recognize that the as-
sertion that the universe is infinite is neither true nor false, because
this point of reality has not yet been constituted by our sensitiveness
or thought, remaining an open point. In this case, according to the
idealist thesis, there would be no matter of fact in virtue of which
the sentence declaring the infinity of the universe would be true or
false. And if there is no fact in reality about the infinity or finitude of
the universe, then there is no truth or falsehood tied to the assertion
that the universe is infinite.
However, if for the realists any declarative sentence P must be
true or false, regardless of the evidence, then for any statement P
(P ∨ ¬P)
which is the well-known logical principle of the excluded middle,
will be true. After all, when P is true, ¬P is false, and when P is
false, ¬P is true, and a disjunction of a truth and a falsity is always
true.
On the other hand, if truth depends on verifiability, as anti-realists
believe, then there may be a sentence Q that lacks both favourable
and contrary evidence. In this case, Q is neither true nor false. But
whatever the reason for the lack of evidence of the truth or falsity of
Q, it will also be a motive for there being no evidence for the truth
or falsity of ¬Q, which also will be neither true nor false. Since both
Q and ¬Q are neither true nor false, their disjunction Q ∨ ¬Q will
not be either. In particular, Q ∨ ¬Q will not be true. That is, not
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all instances of the excluded middle will be true, and therefore the
excluded middle will not be a logical principle for the anti-realist
(Dummett, 1978; Durante, 2011).11
Only for the realists, then, the excluded middle will be a logical
principle impossible to be false. The anti-realists have no reason to
accept the unrestricted validity of the excluded middle. On the con-
trary, they have reason to reject it. The most general conception of
the structure of reality which they assume, in which mind or sensi-
tivity has a constitutive role and truth depends on verifiability, gives
them grounds for denying the universal validity of the excluded mid-
dle. However, if realists and anti-realists disagree on the validity of
a logical principle, then the logical systems that regulate the infer-
ences accepted by each group are also different. In rejecting the
excluded middle, the anti-realists also reject all arguments whose
validity depends on it, and the two groups will thus have incompati-
ble standards of inference given by different and incompatible logics
(Durante, 2011, 39).
It is important at this point to make clear the distinction between
Dummett’s approach and our proposal for the criterion of logical in-
compatibility. Dummett wanted to reform metaphysics. For him,
any metaphysical proposal made in traditional terms, such as the-
ses (1) and (2), would be only a supervenient image of a theory of
meaning whose logical bases would constitute the only true meta-
11 Both in the realist argument for the acceptance of the excluded middle and in
this idealist argument for its rejection, I am making logical inferences. One could
then accuse me and Michael Dummett of begging the question, after all, we make
use of logical principles to justify and criticize a logical principle. From a more
general perspective, there is no way out of this dilemma. We are doomed to make
logical inferences in our arguments, so any justification of a logical principle will
in some way be circular. However, in our defence here, I can argue that the logical
principle of the excluded middle, whose validity is being defended by realists and
attacked by idealists, was not used in either case. We used only logical principles
that we could classify as more fundamental, related to the behaviour of negation
and disjunction in connection with the presence and absence of the truth-values
‘true’ and ‘false’.
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physical proposal. He was suspicious of the traditional metaphysical
debates and aimed to replace them with logical and semantic analy-
sis. Then, to understand any instance of the realism vs anti-realism
debate, he would need to produce a complete theory of meaning for
that part of the language that contains the lexical terms of the de-
bate. This task proved to be very demanding and a weighty burden.
I believe that the reason for this difficulty in applying Dummett’s
method lies in the fact that our metaphysical theses and presuppo-
sitions are almost always incomplete and poorly detailed, leaving
many open points which would be necessary for the production of
a complete theory of meaning in Dummett’s moulds. By not being
fully detailed and possessing openings, our metaphysical ideas that
influence our use of language are subject to be completed differently
by different philosophers, which would lead to multiple possibilities
of discordant theories of meaning. Perhaps this practical difficulty in
applying Dummett’s method explains why his approach, though in-
sightful, has gained so few adherents among contemporary philoso-
phers.
Our proposal for the criterion of logical incompatibility, how-
ever, is far less pretentious. In the examples of debates we have
presented, we do not describe in detail the positions of either side.
We only mention generically the crucial aspects that clarify the dis-
agreements. For example, in the debate between phenomenalism
and realism of the physical world, the crucial point is that a phe-
nomenalist is someone who supports thesis (2’) that our sensorial
experiences are a constitutive part of physical reality and a realist
understands, on the contrary, that sensorial experiences are sepa-
rate from physical reality, supporting the thesis (1’). What matters
in this debate is only this crucial divergence. All the details of the
various possible ways of completing a phenomenalist or realist po-
sition are dispensable. Therefore, given the incompleteness and the
bias of our understanding and descriptions of the positions on ei-
ther side of the debate, we do not aim to define what logic would
represent all the metaphysical commitments of each side. I do not
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know or need to know what are all the metaphysical commitments
of the phenomenalists and the realists in order to apply the criterion
of logical incompatibility in a successful way. To recognize that this
is a genuine metaphysical debate, I only need to know that whatever
logic expresses all the metaphysical commitments of one of its sides,
this logic is different and incompatible with the logic that expresses
all the metaphysical commitments of the other side. And I know
that. We have seen that the excluded middle is a sentence logically
valid for the realists, but only contingent for the phenomenalists.
So, whatever logic expresses all the metaphysical commitments of
the realists, it is incompatible with the logic that expresses all the
metaphysical commitments of the phenomenalists.
The only requirement to successfully apply the criterion of logical
incompatibility to a specific disagreement is then that we find some
logical feature of the position of one side that is incompatible with
the other. For the various instances of the debate between realism
and anti-realism, Dummett has shown that the principle of excluded
middle is one of these features.
We must, however, resist the temptation of hastily say that the
logic of realism is the first-order classical logic, and the logic of ideal-
ism is the intuitionistic logic. We can safely only say that the idealist
theses are incompatible with first-order classical logic, and all who
stands for an idealist position cannot accept first-order classical logic
as the logic underlying their position. Heiting’s intuitionistic logic,
some intermediate logic (between the intuitionistic and the classi-
cal), even the modal logic S4 could be compatible with instances of
idealism. Similarly, we can also safely say that the realist theses are
incompatible with the intuitionistic logic and with all logics compat-
ible with the rejection of the excluded middle. Any stronger state-
ment in this regard would be hasty and unnecessary for a successful
application of the criterion of logical incompatibility.
The most well-developed example of these debates between anti-
realism and realism is the disagreement between Platonist and con-
structivist mathematicians about the role of the mind in the consti-
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tution of mathematical reality, which we discussed in Section 4. In
this specific example, we have a more forceful linkage of first-order
classical logic as the logic that expresses all the metaphysical com-
mitments of the realist position assumed by the Platonist mathemati-
cians and the linking of intuitionistic logic as representing the meta-
physical commitments of the constructivists. This better-developed
state of the recognition of the logic that represent the metaphysi-
cal commitments on each side of this specific debate is due to the
distinctive feature of mathematics, which makes the logical infer-
ences employed in its development quite explicit. But even here
there is a margin for multiple interpretations. There is no agreement
as to which version of intuitionistic logic is best suited to express
the metaphysical commitments of constructivists, whether Heyting’s
intuitionistic logic, or Johansson’s minimal intuitionistic logic, a lit-
tle more restrictive, or even the positive intuitionistic logic or other
yet more restrictive versions of it such as Vredenduin’s logic of nega-
tionless mathematics. However, in the vast majority of metaphysical
debates, the positions on each side are not so detailed and precise,
and the most we can hope for is the identification of some logical
incompatibility between the opposing views that would give us a
guarantee that the view represented on each side are, in fact, meta-
physically divergent.
We exemplified in this Section a case of successful application of
the criterion of logical incompatibility, and we analyzed in some de-
tail what the requirements for such a use are and what information
it gives us. We have seen, through Dummett’s semantic arguments
about the disagreement in the concept of truth, that the various in-
stances of the debate between realism and anti-realism, when not
interpreted in a restricted ontological way, are genuine metaphysical
debates because the opposing views are logically incompatible. The
realist side accepts the excluded middle as a logical validity, and the
anti-realist side rejects, treating it as a contingent sentence that may
be false in some circumstances. In the next Section, we will criticize
the traditional thesis that there would be a fundamental separation
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between logic and metaphysics. According to this thesis, there would
be a separation between the formal and material aspects of reality;
logic would be responsible only for the former while metaphysics
would take care exclusively of the latter.
6 The Formal Meets The Material: logical principles as
metaphysical principles
The barber paradox is well known and can be expressed in this way:
imagine a small village where lives and works only one barber who
shaves all and only the inhabitants in whom beard grows and that
do not shave themselves. This simple situation is paradoxical be-
cause we can ask the following tricky question: does this barber
shave himself? If we assume that he does, we will conclude that
he does not, because by shaving himself, the barber does not satisfy
the condition characterizing the inhabitants he shaves. We said that
he shaves only those who do not shave themselves. On the other
hand, if we assume that the barber does not shave himself, we will
conclude that he does, because by not shaving himself, he satisfies
the condition that characterizes the inhabitants he shaves. We said
he shaves all those who do not shave themselves. We have, there-
fore, a paradox, because any attempt to attribute truth or falsity to
the statement “the barber shaves himself” fails, because, as we have
stated, the assumption of its truth implies its falsity and the assump-
tion of its falsity implies its truth.
Nathan Salmon12 presented a rather interesting solution to the
barber paradox. He said that there is no paradox because a logical
theorem, which he called Russell’s law, guarantees that there can be
no barber who shaves everyone and only those who do not shave
themselves.
Russell’s law is a theorem of first-order classical logic, that is, it
is a logical principle, a statement true in any interpretation. It states
12 In a lecture given at the IX International Congress of Analytical Philosophy, held
in Fortaleza, Brazil, in May 2014.
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that there is no individual x nor relation R where x relates through
R to all and only the individuals y that do not relate to themselves
through R. In formal language:
¬∃x∀y (R(x,y)↔ ¬R(y,y))
Now consider the following interpreted binary relation:
Shaves(x,y): x shaves y.
If Russell’s law is true for any relation R, it is, in particular, true
for the relation Shaves. Then the following sentence, an instance
obtained from Russell’s law replacing the generic relation R by the
specific and interpreted relation Shaves, is also a theorem of first-
order classical logic:
¬∃x ∀y (Shaves(x,y)↔ ¬Shaves(y,y))
However, this sentence states precisely that there is no individual
who shaves all and only those who do not shave themselves. That
is, the statement saying that there is no such a barber is a logical
truth; a theorem of first-order classical logic that cannot be false.
So, says Salmon, the laws of logic prohibit the existence of this para-
doxical barber. It is logically impossible for a barber to shave all
and only those who do not shave themselves, for the statement of
his non-existence is a logical theorem, a true sentence in all possible
circumstances. If there is no such barber, there is no paradox, which
is solved by the powers of first-order classical logic.
This ingenious solution to the barber paradox proposed by
Salmon assumes two indissociable commitments:
(i) It assumes that whatever logic governs our inferences about
cities, barbers and other everyday facts of life, this logic is
compatible with first-order classical logic, in a way that the
theorems of first-order classical logic will also be theorems of
this logic.
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(ii) It also assumes that whatever thing its existence is forbidden
by first-order classical logic, such as our paradoxical barber,
this thing does not exist at all. That is, there cannot be a thing
which a theorem of first-order classical logic denies its exis-
tence.
(i) is a commitment to first-order classical logic and (ii) is a commit-
ment to the concept of existence tied to first-order classical logic. In
justifying the non-existence of the barber by claiming that it follows
from a logical theorem, Salmon is using this theorem as a meta-
physical principle, which makes explicit a fundamental feature of all
beings. To know: there is no, and there can be no individual which
relates to all and only those which do not relate to themselves. This
feature is a characteristic of all individuals and all relations, and is,
therefore, a metaphysical principle.13
Similarly, we can consider that all universal logical theorems,
with the form
∀x𝛼(x)
represent necessities or obligations imposed on all beings, and the
theorems with the form of negations of existential sentences
¬∃x𝛼(x)
13 The barber paradox is just a toy version of Russell’s paradox, which
led mathematicians to abandon the schema of unrestricted comprehension,
∃x∀y ((y ∈ x)↔ 𝜙(y)), along with the naive set theory. If we instantiate ‘𝜙(y)’ by
‘¬(y ∈ y)’, we obtain ∃x∀y ((y ∈ x)↔ ¬(y ∈ y)), whose negation is an instance of
Russell’s law with ‘∈’ instead of ‘R’. Thus, not all meaningful properties expressible
in the first-order language define a set. The property “it’s not a member of itself”,
which, in addition to being meaningful is expressible by ‘¬(y ∈ y)’, is forbidden by
Russell’s law of existing as an individuality given by the set of its extension. This
restriction means that properties cannot be indiscriminately treated as individual
things that exist. Russell’s law shows us that this fact is not a limitation of set the-
ory, but a characteristic of the structure of reality given by classical logic, that is,
a metaphysical commitment of all who reason according to the first-order classical
logic.
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such as Russell’s law, represent impossibilities or prohibitions im-
posed upon them. The set of theorems with these two forms of
a given logic L quite explicitly characterizes the most general be-
haviour of the beings according to this logic and, in so doing, com-
pose a detailed metaphysical explanation of the structure of reality
and the concept of existence linked to L.
For example, the classical theorem
¬∃x (P(x) ∧ ¬P(x))
establishes a feature of all beings admissible by those who reason
according to classical logic, which constitutes the prohibition or im-
possibility of any individual to satisfy and not satisfy any property P.
The classical theorem
∀y (P(y) ∨ ¬P(y))
establishes a feature of all the beings admissible under classical logic
that constitutes the obligation or necessity of any individual to satisfy
or not satisfy any property P.
In describing what is impossible (or forbidden) and what is nec-
essary (or obligatory) to all beings, without exception, these and the
other quantificational theorems of classical logic constitute a char-
acterization of the most general structure of reality, imposed on all
beings, which makes classical logic a metaphysical doctrine.
Presented in these logical terms, however, this metaphysical doc-
trine lacks the pictorial appeals of traditional presentations of meta-
physical propositions. The quantificational theorems of a logical sys-
tem are like the algebraic equations that analytically describe a ge-
ometric situation that also has a pictorial description given by the
equations’ graphs. Yet just as the Cartesian isomorphism showed
that algebraic equations and geometric figures are but two different
ways of presenting and understanding the same facts, our isomor-
phism hypothesis assumes that the metaphysical doctrines linked to
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logical systems are only a different analytic mode to present meta-
physical theses.
On the one hand, our inferential practices such as the one ex-
emplified in Nathan Salmon’s solution to the barber paradox corrob-
orate the metaphysical weight we give to the quantificational the-
orems of logic. On the other hand, philosophers do not usually
recognize or label as metaphysical the structure of reality that the
quantificational theorems of logic compel us to accept. They gener-
ally label it formal structure and tend to separate the formal domain
of logic from the material realm of metaphysics.
Two factors might explain this separation. The first is the ubiq-
uity that the thesis of the metaphysical neutrality of logic has struck
in the contemporary orthodoxy. The second factor, related to the
first, is that when traversing the history of philosophy we see that the
dominant conception has always been that there is only one logic,
which has improved over time, but until very recently remained the
only logic, while metaphysical proposals have always been multi-
ple and motive of controversies since ancient philosophy. If there is
only one logic but many metaphysical proposals, it would not make
much sense to label as metaphysical the demands that this unique
logic imposes on the structure of reality. Logic was, then, tradition-
ally viewed as prior to metaphysics and neutral to the various con-
troversies of this discipline. The demands that logic makes on the
structure of reality were labelled, then, as formal, in contrast to the
demands of metaphysics that were regarded as material. However,
the proliferation of proposals of alternative logical systems, since the
second half of the twentieth century, has provided us with the theo-
retical opportunity to reflect on the nature of the different demands
on the structure of reality made by different logical systems and to
challenge their classification as merely formal requirements. That is
what we are doing in this article.
We can, for instance, reflect on the fact that one of the demands
that first-order classical logic makes on the structure of reality and
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which is not made by intuitionistic logic is that according to classical
logic everything that exists must satisfy the following obligation:
∀y (P(y) ∨ ¬P(y))
The structure of reality linked to classical logic is more rigid than
that related to intuitionistic logic because the former makes more
demands than the latter. All intuitionistic theorems are classical the-
orems, but not the opposite. The above formula, a first-order vari-
ation of the excluded middle, is a classical but not an intuitionistic
theorem. Many other formulas are like this, classical but not intu-
itionistic theorems. Then the concept of existence given by classical
logic demands from every existing thing that it satisfies or does not
satisfy any property P. However, the concept of existence given by
intuitionistic logic does not make this requirement. The structure of
reality given by intuitionistic logic admits beings that neither satisfy
nor don’t satisfy some specific properties. So the reality, according
to intuitionistic logic, has more possibilities than the reality accord-
ing to classical logic. Its structure is less rigid because it has fewer
rules than the reality described by classical logic. There are facts ad-
missible to beings conceived according to intuitionistic logic that are
inadmissible to beings when they are conceived according to classi-
cal logic.
If we recall our discussions of the previous Section that relate
the acceptance of the excluded middle to the realist theses and the
rejection of the excluded middle to the idealist theses, this less rigid
structure linked to intuitionistic logic makes perfect sense. If the
mind or our sensory experiences play a constitutive role in reality, as
idealists argue, then reality is more malleable than if it were com-
pletely independent of our capabilities. If the mind, for example,
plays a constitutive role in reality, we can imagine the beings to be
subject to transformations or processes made possible by our men-
tal activity that would be forbidden to beings when their existence is
conceived as independent of our mind. Our mind could produce real
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facts that would be impossible or inconceivable when we dissociate
existence from our mental activity, as do the realists.
These considerations suggest that there is no a priori motive for
separating the structural features of reality given by logical theorems
such as ∀y (P(y) ∨ ¬P(y)), as being of a formal and diverse nature
from the structural characteristics of reality given by principles that
we have historically called metaphysical, such as the realist and ide-
alist thesis. Those who espouse this separation often appeal to the
notions of possibility and necessity. They say that there are logical
possibilities that are not metaphysically possible and that there are
metaphysical necessities that are not logically necessary.
For example, one could argue that it would be logically but not
metaphysically possible to exist an individual with the magical power
to transform any material object into any other instantaneously and
effortlessly. To say that the existence of this individual is logically
possible means to say that the admission of her existence does not
imply any logical contradiction. While to say that the existence of
this individual is not metaphysically possible means to say that the
assumption of her existence, although not implying any logical con-
tradiction, oppose some principle that we take as a metaphysical
principle.
However, this separation between the nature of what is logical
and what is metaphysical is arbitrary. It starts from the assumption
that logic is prior and broader than metaphysics. Yet, we find no
more robust justification for this assumption than the fragile histor-
ical reasons previously mentioned, related to the view long held in
the past that there would be only one logic but many metaphysical
proposals. There is, on the other hand, a strong enough reason to
deny this separation and to bet on the hypothesis of the isomorphism
between logic and metaphysics. It is constituted by the fact that the
main characteristic of both the principles traditionally held as meta-
physical as well as of the logical principles, usually characterized as
formal, is that these two kinds of principles are absolutely general.
The most fundamental aspect that would characterize both logic and
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metaphysics as philosophical disciplines would be the absolute gen-
erality of the principles of these two areas.
In the next Section, I will argue in defence of this thesis of the ab-
solute generality of logic and in doing so I will present some logical
motivations for the (isomorphism) hypothesis that logical principles
are metaphysical principles.
7 Logic Does Not Separate: absolute generality
Our adopted textbook definition of metaphysics, as the discipline
that deals with the characterization of the most general structure
of reality, reveals its absolute generality. Nothing escapes from the
most general structure of reality. But what does it mean to say that
the principles of logic are absolutely general? When I say that the
principles of logic have absolute generality, I mean by this that the
quantificational theorems of logic do not divide or separate reality.
They do not refer to specific beings or part of them. They always re-
fer to all beings. By saying that the principles of logic are absolutely
general I intend to mean that it is not possible to affirm anything par-
ticular through a logical theorem, but only to make utterly inclusive
statements which, precisely for this reason, constitute metaphysical
principles that characterize the most general structure of reality.14
14 The expression “absolute generality” is often used in the literature related to
the domain of quantifiers and has, in that context, a different meaning to what
I use here. The detractors of the thesis of the absolute generality of the domain
of quantification take the position that is incoherent to admit that there can be
an absolutely general domain of quantification, which includes absolutely every-
thing, without any restriction. The domains of all quantificational sentences would
always be restricted to some class. On the other hand, the proponents of the the-
sis of absolute generality assume that there is no problem in admitting an utterly
generic domain of quantification, which includes absolutely everything (Santos,
2013). My use of the expression “absolute generality” in this text is not related
with this debate. When I say that a given quantified sentence S is absolutely gen-
eral (or generic), I mean by this that for any domain of quantification D, what S
states applies to all individuals in D and not to just a few. So if S is an absolutely
generic sentence, given any domain of quantification D, S does not separate the
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I am not here referring to a characteristic of classical logic or
some specific logical system, but a feature that I consider fundamen-
tal to any logical system. So fundamental that it would serve as
one of the necessary criteria to characterize logic. Therefore, there
cannot be a theorem with a demonstration that assures that all log-
ical systems meet the standard of absolute generality. We may even
enunciate and demonstrate some restricted versions of such a theo-
rem, but they will always be specific to some particular system or set
of logical systems. It is a philosophical matter of disciplinary demar-
cation, and many logicians may disagree with this proposal. The best
we can do is to present arguments and motives for the acceptance of
this criterion, hoping that we are not as arbitrary in this respect as
those whom we accuse of arbitrarily classifying logic as anterior and
neutral to metaphysics.
In addition to the arguments already presented in the previous
Sections that led us to the proposition of the absolute generality of
logic, I will reinforce the motivation for its adoption by arguing that
classical and intuitionistic first-order logic satisfie the standard of
absolute generality.
We have said above that all logical theorems with the forms
∀x𝛼(x) and ¬∃x𝛼(x)
are metaphysical principles that establish obligations and prohibi-
tions that characterize the most general behaviour of beings. But
what about the other logical theorems, such as the propositional
ones? What is their relation to metaphysics?
elements of D between those that satisfy it and those that do not. S is absolutely
general because it is satisfied by all individuals of the domain. The typical example
of an absolutely general statement is a universal statement ∀x𝛼(x). Yet there are
absolutely general statements with other logical forms, hence the need for a spe-
cific name. When I say that a logical system satisfies absolute generality, I mean
something very close to the assertion that all its quantificational theorems are ab-
solutely generic statements, with some additions that will be clarified throughout
this Section.
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All theorems of a logical system relate to one another so that
given any propositional theorem, it is always possible to find quan-
tificational versions of it that will also be theorems. The quantifica-
tional classical theorems
∀y (Q(y) ∨ ¬Q(y)) and ¬∃x (P(x) ∧ ¬P(x))
which we saw earlier are quantificational versions of the classical
propositional theorems
(Q ∨ ¬Q) and ¬(P ∧ ¬P).
Because of this relationship between logical theorems, divergences
in propositional theorems have consequences in the quantificational
ones. The difference between classical and intuitionistic logic is
propositional, but this propositional difference has consequences in
quantificational theorems. Exactly because excluded middle
(Q ∨ ¬Q) is not a theorem of intuitionistic logic, this quantificational
version of it ∀y (Q(y) ∨ ¬Q(y)) will not be either.
Precisely because propositional divergences have quantificational
consequences, we do not have to limit the criterion of logical incom-
patibility to the quantificational theorems. For a specific logic to pro-
vide a concept of existence, it must have quantifiers and be at least
a first-order logic. However, since propositional divergences have
quantificational consequences, any logical divergence, even at the
propositional level, connects with quantificational divergences and
thus characterizes a metaphysical disagreement. It is also because of
this interconnection between logical theorems that we have previ-
ously stated that what expresses metaphysical commitments are the
logical systems understood in their totality and not isolated logical
principles.
A rather direct way of demonstrating that a particular logical sys-
tem L satisfies the criterion of absolute generality would be to show
that L has no existential statements among its theorems. That is,
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the absolute generality of L would be ensured if none of its theo-
rems had the form ∃x𝛼(x). This is because the existential sentences
are precisely those that divide reality, that affirm specificities and pe-
culiarities of some but not all beings. When I say, for example, that
ghosts exist, through the sentence ‘∃xGhost(x)’, I am dividing reality
between the individuals who satisfy it and those who do not; I am
affirming a particularity, a specific aspect of reality and not a general
feature of it. By affirming particularities and specificities applicable
only to some individuals, existential affirmations do not describe the
most general characteristics of all beings; they are not absolutely
general. So, if I argue that a fundamental feature of any logical prin-
ciple is its absolute generality, no logical principle should have the
form ∃x𝛼(x), and hence no logical system should have existential
statements among its theorems.15 The problem is that this is a false
assumption.
The existential statement ∃x (P(x) ∨ ¬P(x)), for example, is a
first-order classical theorem. In general, if 𝛼 is a propositional theo-
rem, then ∃x𝛼(x) is also theorem and hence classical logic is loaded
with existential statements among its theorems. There is, however,
hope for this situation. When 𝛼 is a propositional theorem, not only
∃x𝛼(x) but also ∀x𝛼(x) is a quantificational theorem. That is:
⊢ 𝛼 ⇒ ⊢ ∃x𝛼(x) ⇒ ⊢ ∀x𝛼(x)
Then the existential statements ‘∃x𝛼(x)’ which are theorems because
the subformula in the scope of the existential quantifier ‘𝛼(x)’ has the
15 It is worth noting that existential affirmation is precisely the logical form of the
sentences that point out the ontological commitments of a theory. Curiously, the
logical form of the statements that express the ontological commitments of a theory
is the same logical form that does not meet the standard of absolute generality
and could not take part in a metaphysical characterization of the reality. That
reinforces the distinction between metaphysics and ontology that we have assumed.
Ontology gives the things that exist, which completely fill up reality, whose most
general characteristics are provided by metaphysics, which, in doing so, defines the
meaning of existence.
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logical form of a propositional theorem ‘𝛼’ do not threaten the ab-
solute generality of classical logic, since the particularity they claim,
∃x𝛼(x), is due to a generality, since ‘∀x𝛼(x)’ is also a theorem.
However, not all the existential affirmations that are theorems
of classical logic are so because they share part of their logical form
with a propositional theorem. In a system with identity and individ-
ual constants, for any constant ‘c’ the existential statement ∃x (x = c)
is a theorem, but the corresponding universal statement ∀x (x = c) is
not.
This fact, however, does not threaten the absolute generality of
classical and intuitionistic logic. In spite of the existential form, the
only particularity of the sentence ∃x (x = c) is linguistic, given by the
constant ‘c’. Sentences with the form ∃x (x = c) state only that one of
the linguistic conventions of these logics is that all names (the indi-
vidual constants) shall denote some individual. If our language has
n individual constants c1, ..., cn, then for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the sentence
∃x (x = ci) will be a theorem that states that the constant ‘ci’ denotes
an individual. These sentences, taken together, express the language
convention that the individual constants must denote. They then
only regulate the use of individual constants. The only information
they give us, beyond this naming convention, is that reality is not
empty. There are beings. This fact, however, is not particular, but
general. In affirming that there are beings, that reality is not empty,
we are stating a general characteristic of the reality assumed by clas-
sical and intuitionistic logic and, therefore, respecting the thesis of
absolute generality.
A simple way of realizing that the theorems involving individual
constants do not threaten the standard of absolute generality is to
show that if we replace each individual constant that occurs in them
with a variable, and take the universal closure of the resulting for-
mula, we get a theorem. The theorem ∃x (x = c), for example, gives
us the theorem ∀y ∃x (x = y). In general, the following result holds
for classical and intuitionistic first-order logic:
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⊢ 𝛼(c) ⇒ ⊢ ∀y𝛼(y)
This means that no theorem with the form 𝛼(c) threatens the stan-
dard of absolute generality, because what they say about ‘c’ is true
for all individuals of the domain of quantification, since ∀y𝛼(y) is
also a theorem.16
So far we have seen that for existential theorems that have the
form of propositional theorems, the following rule holds:
⊢ 𝛼 ⇒ ⊢ ∃x𝛼(x) ⇒ ⊢ ∀x𝛼(x)
If we prove that, regardless of the logical form of 𝛼, given an exis-
tential theorem ∃x𝛼(x), if we replace the existential quantifier with
a universal, the result ∀x𝛼(x) remains a theorem, then we would
have a complete argument for the absolute generality. That is, if we
demonstrate that, regardless of the form of 𝛼,
⊢ ∃x𝛼(x) ⇒ ⊢ ∀x𝛼(x)
this result would guarantee that any particularity that we could as-
sert through an existential theorem ∃x𝛼(x) would be only a partial
affirmation of a generality assured by another theorem, given by
∀x𝛼(x), which would ensure the absolute generality.
16 The demonstration that ⊢ 𝛼(c)⇒ ⊢ ∀y𝛼(y) holds in classical and intuitionistic
logic is a mere corollary of Prawitz (2006)’s normalization theorem for systems of
natural deduction. For our purposes of arguing in favor of the absolute generality,
the elimination of the individual constants given by this result is sufficient and will
be assumed in the remaining arguments of this Section. It is interesting to note,
however, that the forced elimination of individual constants made by regimentation
in Quine’s canonical notation, which substitutes them for descriptions, does not
constitute a problem only when we restrict ourselves to classical logic. Because it
does not bear subjunctive conditionals and counterfactual situations, classical logic
protects itself from Kripke (2001)’s celebrated criticism of the descriptive approach
to names, which apply only in contexts that admit such conditionals. Intuitionistic
logic, however, is vulnerable to Kripke’s criticism because its translation into the
modal logic S4 demonstrates its capacity to harbour subjunctive conditionals and
counterfactual situations.
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This result is not generally valid for classical logic, but there is
a rather simple proof of it for intuitionistic logic.17 Intuitionistic
logic is therefore absolutely general. All its theorems containing indi-
vidual constants are mere partial affirmations of universal theorems
without constants, and all its existential theorems are special cases of
universal theorems. This means that any theorem that makes a par-
ticular statement is covered by a universal theorem, showing that
that particular statement is only a partial affirmation of a general
situation. Intuitionistic logic, then, meets the standard of absolute
generality.
In classical logic, in the vast majority of cases where ∃x𝛼(x) is a
theorem, ∀x𝛼(x) will also be, and situations supposedly challenging
absolute generality are quite rare.18 Yet there are exceptions. The
only ones I know are variations of the following sentence:
17 In Veloso, Pereira & Haeusler (2012) we can find several related and more general
results than this one, which I now present the outline of the proof, that is also
obtained as a corollary of the normalization theorem: suppose that we have a
normal proof, 𝜋, of ∃x𝛼(x) in a natural deduction system for intuitionistic logic.
Being a normal proof and having ∃x𝛼(x) as its last formula, the last rule of 𝜋 is
either an existential introduciton rule (∃I) or a rule of the intuitionistic absurdity
(⊥). As the intuitionistic logic is consistent, the last rule application in 𝜋 cannot
be (⊥), otherwise, if we exclude from 𝜋 this final rule application we would obtain
a proof of absurd without premises, which would be a proof of the inconsistency
of intuitionistic logic. Then the last rule application in 𝜋 is an application of (∃I).
We can then replace this last rule application in 𝜋 by an application of the rule
(∀I), which has exactly the same form as (∃I), what resulting in a proof 𝜋′ whose
last sentence will be ∀x𝛼(x). This application of (∀I) respects the rule’s constraints
because the premise of the last rule of 𝜋 does not depend on any hypothesis since
𝜋 is the proof of a theorem (has no open hypotheses) and the application of (∃I)
does not discharge any assumption. The proof 𝜋′ is then a proof of ∀x𝛼(x) correct
and with no open hypothesis. Then ∀x𝛼(x) is a theorem of intuitionistic logic.
18 As the set of classical theorems is infinite, to speak of “vast majority” without
any qualification is an abuse of language. We can understand “vast majority” in
this context as stating that for any finite limit n in the number of symbols of the
formulas (complexity), the number of existential theorems with complexity less
than n whose substitution of the existential quantifier for the universal results in
a theorem is much higher than the number of existential theorems whose same
substitution results in a universal formula which is not a theorem.
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∃x (P(x)→ ∀y P(y))
This sentence is a first-order classical theorem, but the sentence
∀x (P(x)→ ∀y P(y)), obtained by replacing the main existential quan-
tifier with a universal quantifier, is not a classical theorem. It is worth
noting that since this result is valid for intuitionistic logic, this excep-
tion and any other that may exist is an existential affirmation that is
not an intuitionistic theorem. That is, ∃x (P(x)→ ∀y P(y)) is a clas-
sical theorem, but it is not an intuitionistic one. Let us compare the
existential affirmation, which is a classical theorem, with the uni-
versal affirmation, which is not a theorem, to try to understand the
situation better.
∃x (P(x)→ ∀y P(y)): there is at least one individual who,
if it is P, then all are Ps.
∀x (P(x)→ ∀y P(y)): given any individual,
if it is P, then all are Ps.
It may even seem that the first sentence is making a particular state-
ment about some specific individuals, that it is separating reality and
that it is not absolutely generic. However, when we try to understand
why it is a theorem, why there can be no interpretation in which it
is false, we realize that despite its existential form, it does not make
any particular statement.
The second sentence is not a classical theorem because we can
conceive the circumstance in which some individuals are Ps, and oth-
ers are not. In this circumstance, when we instantiate the universal
sentence with an individual that is P, the conditional P(x)→ ∀y P(y)
will have a true antecedent P(x) and a false consequent ∀y P(y).
Then the conditional P(x)→ ∀y P(y) is false and also the universal
sentence ∀x (P(x)→ ∀y P(y)), since it has a false instance.
The first sentence is a theorem because both in the circumstance
that some individuals are not Ps, and in the circumstance in which
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all are, the sentence is true. When some individuals are not Ps, if we
instantiate the existential with one of these individuals that is not
P, the conditional P(x)→ ∀y P(y) will be true for having false an-
tecedent P and false consequent ∀y P(y). Then the whole existencial
∃x (P(x)→ ∀y P(y)) is also true for having a true instance. When all
individuals are Ps, the conditional P(x)→ ∀y P(y) is true, for having
a true consequent. Then the existential sentence ∃x (P(x)→ ∀y P(y))
is also true because all of its instances are true.
So, in spite of its existential form, the sentence ∃x(P(x)→∀yP(y))
is only valid because in each of the possible circumstances it is true.
The two possible circumstances analyzed, that some individuals are
not Ps and that all individuals are Ps exhaust the possibilities.
Viewed in isolation, each of these circumstances represents a par-
ticular situation, a specific and distinct possibility in which the facts
can occur. But the set of these two possibilities, that is, the assertion
of their disjunction, has no particularity and represents an absolutely
general characteristic of reality, corresponding to an instance of the
excluded middle (∀x P(x) ∨ ¬∀x P(x)).
It turns out that the recognition of the validity of the existen-
tial affirmation ∃x (P(x)→ ∀y P(y)) presented above does not tell us
which of these two possible circumstances is responsible for the sen-
tence’s truth. There are, then, two quite distinct motives that justify
the truth of the sentence, and finding that the sentence is valid does
not tell us which of these motives is in effect. The sentence’s truth
may be due to the fact that some individuals are not Ps, and there-
fore, it can be instantiated so that antecedent and consequent of its
conditional are false. Yet it’s truth may also be due to the fact that all
individuals are Ps and therefore any instance of the existential gives
both true antecedent and true consequent.
So, there are two distinct circumstances that represent two dif-
ferent ways in which the sentence can be true, and the recognition of
its truth does not tell us which of these two is the actual way in which
the sentence is true. Moreover, these two circumstances exhaust all
possibilities in which facts can occur. Then, although the sentence
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has the logical form of a particular existential statement that sepa-
rates reality, the realization of its truth does not give us any specific
information about the world. This particular information suggested
by the existential form of the sentence would only be communicated
to us if we could know which of the two possible circumstances se-
cures its truth. Since the mere fact of recognizing the sentence as
valid does not give us this information, and since the disjunction
of these two possibilities is an absolutely general situation that ex-
hausts all cases, then we can safely say that the sentence’s truth does
not inform us of any particularity about reality and therefore does
not challenge the absolute generality of classical logic.
Since the sentence we analyzed, ∃x (P(x)→ ∀y P(y)), is not an
intuitionistic theorem, we can be assured that it is not a peculiar-
ity of the argument we presented the fact that the recognition of
its validity does not inform us on which of two possible particular
circumstances is the one responsible for its truth. Any semantic jus-
tification for the validity of this sentence will necessarily depend on
some instance of the excluded middle; otherwise, it would be an in-
tuitionistic theorem. In addition, as we know that whenever ∃x𝛼(x)
is an intuitionistic theorem, ∀x𝛼(x) also is; then, any other possible
candidate to a counterexample to the absolute generality will be sim-
ilar to this one, in the sense that the recognition of its validity will
also depend on the principle of the excluded middle, and therefore
it will not challenge the absolute generality of logic, for the same
reasons we presented for the present case.
We can finally conclude that even possessing certain existential
theorems whose universal counterparts are not theorems, classical
logic, as well as intuitionistic logic, respects the standard of absolute
generality. Almost all its existential theorems are just partial affirma-
tions of universal statements that are also theorems, and those that
are not so, do not make any particular claim but also only utterly
general ones. The theorems of classical logic, then, do not divide or
separate reality. They do not refer to specific characteristics of spe-
cific individuals, but only to the general characteristics of all individ-
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uals and therefore constitute metaphysical principles that provide us
with a characterization of the most general structure of reality.
As we have already mentioned, it is not possible to yield a single
argument for the absolute generality of all logical systems, simply
because there is no consensus among the logicians about the lim-
its of their discipline. In addition to arguments such as these that I
have presented about the absolute generality of specific logical sys-
tems, the maximum we can aspire to is a result that would show, for
example, what generic formal features logical systems should have
in order to respect absolute generality. This exciting investigation,
however, goes far beyond the purposes of this text.
In the analysis of the debates realism vs idealism presented in
Section 5, we saw an example of a successful application of the crite-
rion of logical incompatibility. That is, we saw an application of the
criterion in which the logical incompatibility of opposing positions
has shown that that divergence was a genuine metaphysical diver-
gence. For the sake of example, before we finish, let us briefly discuss
in the next Section a case in which the application of the criterion
of logical incompatibility demonstrates that the dissenting position
defended by one of the sides is not, as proposed by its author, a le-
gitimate metaphysical dissent, what characterizes the disagreement
as merely verbal.
8 McDaniel vs van Inwagen: the univocity of being
In “Ways of Being”, Kris McDaniel (2009) presents a defence of what
he considers to be the Heideggerian version of the thesis that exis-
tence is not univocal. There would be, for Heidegger, multiple modes
of being: “there are many things which we designate as ‘being’, and
we do so in various senses” (Heidegger, 1993, 26). McDaniel quickly
mentions some historical roots of the thesis and proposes an inter-
pretation for the Heideggerian version in which the multiple modes
of being are identified through the equivocality of meanings present
in our uses of expressions such as “being”, “existence”, “exists”, “is
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an entity”, “there are”. He classifies these expressions as analogi-
cal, and defines: an expression is analogical when it “has a generic
sense which, roughly, applies to objects of different sorts in virtue
of those objects exemplifying very different features.” (McDaniel,
2009, 295). He offers the mereological locution “is a part of” as a
paradigmatic model of analogical expression and exemplifies some
of its uses:
this hand is a pat of that man, the class of women is a part of
the class of human beings, this subregion is a part of space,
this minute is a part of this hour, this premise is a part of this
argument, and so forth. (McDaniel, 2009, 295)
For McDaniel, there is a common idea to these various uses, but
it is not this common idea that explains and justifies each one of
them. Each specific use applies to objects of very different types and
is explained by one particular fundamental relation. Each of these
fundamental relations represents a distinct concept of what it is to
be a part that is singular to the kind of things to which it applies.
Therefore, the reasons why there are parts in each case are also fun-
damentally different (p. 296). That is, “being a part of” is an analog-
ical expression for McDaniel because there would be several distinct
ways in which something is part of something. Likewise, the multi-
ple meanings of expressions related to beings would express the fact
that there are many ways of being, and the concept of being would
also be analogical. I will use the expression ‘thesis of equivocality’ to
refer to McDaniel’s position.
At the other end of the disagreement that interests us here is
Peter van Inwagen, who supports the contrary thesis that existence
is univocal. There are no multiple ways of being but a single one.
For van Inwagen, the concept of being would not be analogical, and
any existing thing exists in precisely the same way and sense as any
other. I will use the expression ‘thesis of univocity’ to refer to van
Inwagen’s position.
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The divergence between the theses of univocity and equivocality
is apparently a metaphysical divergence on whether in the general
structure of reality there is room for different modes of existence,
or whether it has only one mode of existence. Our purpose here
is to apply the criterion of logical incompatibility to show that, as
treated by these two authors, this is not a legitimate metaphysical
divergence but only a merely verbal disagreement. Moreover, in this
particular case, the criterion will also help us to realize that the cause
of this verbal disagreement is a misuse of words by defenders of the
equivocality thesis. We will see that the way McDaniel imports the
Heideggerian vocabulary about the many modes of being is inade-
quate and misleading.
Having made these preliminary clarifications, I shall now present
a brief summary of the thesis of univocity as advocated by van Inwa-
gen (2009) in “Being, Existence, and Ontological Commitment” and
the main points of the equivocality thesis McDaniel (2009) supports
in “Ways of Being”. Then I shall present a criticism of the equiv-
ocality thesis that van Inwagen (2014) himself does, in “Modes of
Being and Quantification” where he performs a formal regimenta-
tion of the equivocality thesis in first-order classical logic, the same
system in which he also regiments his own thesis of univocity. These
regimentations make it possible to employ the criterion of logical in-
compatibility and to conclude that the disagreement is not genuinely
metaphysical. At the end of the Section, we explain what conclusions
we can draw from this analysis.
In “Being, Existence, and Ontological Commitment”, van Inwa-
gen presents how he understands that ontology should be practised
and what its fundamental theses are. He credits these theses to
Quine and labels them as “the five theses to Quine’s meta-ontology":
T1) Being is not an activity.
T2) Being is the same as existence.
T3) Existence is univocal.
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T4) The single sense of being or existence is adequately captured
by the existential quantifier of formal logic.
T5) Ontological questions must be resolved through the method of
ontological commitment.
If being and existence are the same (T2), then it is also the same
talking about the univocity or equivocality of being, and talk about
a single one or multiple ways of existing. Moreover, if existence
is univocal (T3) and its only meaning is captured by the existen-
tial quantifier (T4), then there is a single and unrestricted domain
of quantification that encompasses all that exists, and the logical
rules that regulate the existential quantifier exhaust the possibilities
for the meaning of existence. These theses authorize van Inwagen
to agree with Quine’s statement that “existence is what existential
quantification expresses. There are things of type F if and only if
∃x F(x)” (Quine, 1969, 97).
Further, since according to T5, van Inwagen accepts the ontolog-
ical method of Quine which we present in Section 2, then the for-
mal logic to which he refers in thesis T4 is first-order classical logic.
That is, the existential quantifier that captures the unique meaning
of existence is for van Inwagen the existential quantifier of first-order
classical logic.
Van Inwagen’s thesis of univocity is then summarized by the ac-
ceptance that it is in first-order classical logic that we must gather
our theses about being, that there is a unique and unrestricted do-
main of quantification that is accessed by the existential quantifier,
whose rules capture the single meaning of existence.
Let us turn now to the thesis of equivocality. I will focus only
on the crucial points sufficient for the understanding of the debate,
omitting several of the thesis’ aspects and details that are not rel-
evant to our question. After initial accounts of the general idea of
the equivocality of being and of several parallel explanations, Mc-
Daniel endeavours to explain Heidegger’s position through formal
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resources as predicates, quantifiers, and variables. He states that
although Heidegger argues that “being comes in many flavors”, he
acknowledges that there is a general sense of being and says that
“the generic concept of being is represented in formal logic by the
unrestricted existential quantifier” standard of first-order logic (Mc-
Daniel, 2009, 301).
Then he wonders: “what is the best way to formally represent
Heidegger’s restricted senses of being?” After quickly refusing the
use of individual constants for this task, he considers the possibility
of special predicates representing the various modes of being; which
he also rules out: “this seems inappropriate, since this procedure
assimilates attributing a way of being to a thing to predicating a
property of that thing”. And he goes on: “ways of being are not
merely special properties that some entities have and others lack,
and so are not most perspicuously represented by predicates” (302).
Then he makes his crucial suggestion:
A natural thought then is that the specific senses of “being”
also are best represented by quantifiers. The notion of a re-
stricted quantifier — one that ranges over only some proper
subset of that which the unrestricted quantifier ranges — is
perfectly intelligible. Heidegger’s senses of “being” are prop-
erly represented in a formal system by special restricted quan-
tifiers. [...] So for every special kind of being recognized by
Heidegger, there corresponds a restricted quantifier whose do-
main is a proper subclass of the domain of the unrestricted
quantifier, and that ranges over all and only those things that
have that kind of being. (p. 302)
Then he makes the following strange statement.
So representing Heidegger’s ways of being by restricted quan-
tifiers — quantifiers that by virtue of their meaning range over
only some proper subset of what the unrestricted existential
quantifier ranges over — seems like an excellent way to pro-
ceed. (pp. 302-303)
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The strangeness here is in the assertion that the restricted quantifiers
are restricted by virtue of their meaning. The immediate question
this statement raises is: what is the meaning of a quantifier? Where,
how, and by whom is it established? The only indication McDaniel
gives of an answer to this question is a quote from Eli Hirsch (2005,
76), which states that quantifiers would be semantically restricted
when “semantic rules implicit in language” establish the restriction
of their domain (McDaniel, 2009, 303). However, he ignores this
suggestion and leaves completely unanswered the question of how
quantifiers get the meaning they have.
To exemplify, he then proposes two types of restricted quantifiers.
One that he calls ‘existenzial’, whose domain of quantification are
entities whose mode of being is to have existenz, which is the mode of
being of concrete and particular things. The other quantifier is what
he calls ‘subsistential’, whose domain is given by the entities that
have subsistence as their mode of being, which is the mode of being of
abstract things. He keeps insisting that it is by virtue of the meaning
of each of these quantifiers that their domain of quantification are
specified (p. 303).
We then have three different existential quantifiers; the generic
existential quantifier of classical logic, whose domain is absolutely
generic, and the restricted quantifiers existenzial and subsistential,
whose domains of quantification are restricted respectively to con-
crete and to abstract beings.
McDaniel argues that, according to Heidegger’s perspective, the
existenzial and subsistential restricted quantifiers must be prior in
meaning to the generic existential quantifier (p 303). He then states
that being prior in meaning, the restricted quantifiers must be se-
mantically primitive, and goes on to investigate how to use these
primitive restricted quantifiers to produce and explain the subsidiary
general sense of being given by the unrestricted existential. For this
analysis, he appeals to the concept of fundamentality.
This discussion and the way he presents it seems hasty and ill-
formulated. His conclusion is also a merely negative one. He presents
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no positive argument to support the priority of meaning of the re-
stricted quantifiers relative to the generic one but only defends this
thesis against an argument attacking it. Even if this defence suc-
ceeds, the problem of his approach that propitiated van Inwagen’s
criticism is the fact that, beyond the mere assertion that there are
different ways of being, and the labelling of some of these modes,
McDaniel does not say a single word that explains, demonstrates, or
clarifies in what the distinction of the multiple ways of being con-
sists. If the abstract existence of subsisting beings is different from
the concrete existence of beings that have existenz, what is this dif-
ference? In addition to their names, what else distinguishes these
two domains of quantification? What features one domain has that
the other lacks? In which ways these two modes of beings are dif-
ferent? What is permitted (or possible) to beings of one kind that is
forbidden (or impossible) to beings from the other? McDaniel leaves
all these questions unanswered. Beyond the postulation of different
modes of being, and the enumeration of some of them, McDaniel
says nothing to explain how different the various ways of being are.
It seems that the two modes of being he exemplified are only two
identical copies of the same one.
This absence of any clarification as to how the multiple modes
of being are different from each other provided fuel for the criticism
of McDaniel’s thesis of the equivocality of being that van Inwagen
(2014) elaborated on “Modes of Being and Quantification”. He took
advantage of this lack of explanation and proposed various ways of
regimenting the thesis of equivocality into first-order classical logic.
Some of them using a many-sorted version of the first-order logic
and interpreting the modes of being through restricted quantifiers,
in precise accordance with McDaniel’s prescriptions (Inwagen, 2014,
20). Some others, however, formalizing the modes of being not as
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quantifiers, but as predicates whose extensions would coincide with
the beings of each so-called way of existence (Inwagen, 2014, 9).19
The main point of his reasoning was to show that any argument
that was valid (or invalid) when evaluated in accordance to the orig-
inal thesis of equivocality would remain valid (or invalid) when eval-
uated in any of the regimentations in first-order classical logic that
he proposed. If to this we add his approach to ontology, in which the
only sense of existence is captured by the general existential quan-
tifier of classical logic, then the regimented versions he proposed
represent a proof that the thesis of equivocality affirms nothing sub-
stantial, since it is compatible with the thesis of univocity. By pos-
sessing versions regimented in first-order classical logic that behave
exactly like the original unregimented thesis, the thesis of equivocal-
ity is, because of this, compatible with the thesis of univocity, since,
according to van Inwagen, the unique existential quantifier of clas-
sical logic expresses and represents the very thesis of univocity. The
foundation of van Inwagen’s criticism is, then, the inert character of
McDaniel’s proposal.
Van Inwagen does not explicitly mention anything similar to our
criterion of logical incompatibility, nor does he assume our hypoth-
esis of the isomorphism between logic and metaphysics. Yet we can
feel here the “strong smell” of the criterion of logical incompatibility.
He understands his own argumentation as a victory of univocity over
the equivocality, a victory which is provided by the first-order regi-
mented versions compatible with the original unregimented thesis
with respect to all arguments which they validate or invalidate.
The interpretation of van Inwagen’s criticism given by the cri-
terion of logical incompatibility is, however, slightly different. We
do not need, in principle, to assume the Inwagerian thesis that one
of the metaphysical commitments of first-order classical logic is the
univocity of being. The controversy over the absolute generality of
19 As many-sorted first-order classical logic is translatable into traditional unsorted
first-order classical logic, all van Inwagen’s regimentations of McDaniel’s equivocal-
ity thesis are equivalent and compatible with plain first-order classical logic.
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the domain of quantification of classical logic present in the litera-
ture (Rayo & Uzquiano, 2009) suggests caution in this regard. In
the absence of this assumption, van Inwagen’s regimented versions
of the equivocality thesis show only that the theses of univocity and
equivocality are logically compatible, and therefore, by the criterion
of logical incompatibility, the disagreement between them is not a
genuine metaphysical disagreement about the most general struc-
ture of reality. It is not even an ontological disagreement, as there is
no dispute about what exists or not. The disagreement is a merely
verbal one. This is the main information we get from the application
of our criterion to this debate. However, when we place side by side
the Heideggerian discourse and vocabulary attached to the thesis of
equivocality and the Quinean discourse and vocabulary of the thesis
of univocity and confront them with the most obvious metaphysical
commitments that the first-order classical logic seems to assume, it
becomes challenging to disagree with van Inwagen.
Perhaps there is a reason to reject also van Inwagen’s thesis of
univocity, because of arguments connected with the absolute gener-
ality of quantifiers or some other motive. However, even if we come
to discover that existence is not univocal, the present analysis autho-
rizes us to safely assert that although there might be multiple ways
of being, McDaniel’s version of Heidegger’s thesis of the equivocality
of existence would not be an acceptable explanation of this fact.
9 Conclusion
The proposition of the criterion of logical incompatibility was mo-
tivated by metaphysical and logical concerns. On the metaphysical
side, my first concern was to defend the discipline from the deflation-
ary attacks which it has always suffered from common sense, as well
as from scientists and also from philosophers. However, as much as
I find these attacks unjustified, I also have always been bothered by
the fact that many specific metaphysical proposals and debates in the
literature some times seem to give us reason to agree with deflation-
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ists. Reflecting on the general structure of reality is a risky, slippery,
treacherous activity, and in many specific cases, we, philosophers,
seem to stumble in our own words and lose ourselves in incoherent
considerations, odd intuitions, and sterile debates.
On the side of logic, I have always been intrigued by the fact that
all our logical justifications are based on principles which themselves
are not justified. What would ground logical principles? What is the
reason for the fact that when we apply them correctly, they lead us
to reliable conclusions?
The hypothesis of the isomorphism between logic and metaphys-
ics and the criterion of logical incompatibility for metaphysical dis-
agreements represent my answer to these concerns. Logical princi-
ples are reliable because they are an expression of the general struc-
ture of reality. They are prescriptions for correct thinking as Frege
teaches us because they are laws that establish what is, in its broad-
est aspect. Logical principles are logical because they are metaphysical
principles.
Metaphysical proposals, in their turn, as characterizations of the
most general structure of reality, are, therefore, supervenient im-
ages of the logical principles. They are linked to them as much
as the geometric figures are connected to the Cartesian graphs of
their algebraic equations. So those supposedly metaphysical propo-
sitions but that have no logical specificity are not genuinely meta-
physical, while the genuinely metaphysical proposals are not sterile,
but rather fertile. Because they possess logical specificity, they influ-
ence and spread through all other subjects on which we reason. By
influencing and affecting all the subjects on which we reason, they
assume the central role expected of a general characterization of re-
ality. The metaphysical proposals are metaphysical because they are
logical.20
20 I want to thank Graham Priest and Yale Weiss for coordinating the City University
of New York Logic and Metaphysics Workshop, as well as the other frequent partic-
ipants, for keeping alive a stimulating and challenging academic environment. I
also thanks José Litiério Gaudimin for his careful reading and corrections.
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